Why the 2020 Detroit Tigers Need to Be Just As Bad As the 2019 Detroit Tigers

2019 was not an easy year to be a Detroit Tigers fan. The team lost a MLB worst 114 games, and in some ways were an even worse team than the 2003 Detroit Tigers, which were one of the worst teams of all time. At the major league level, the team looked lost, devoid of both depth and experience, and it showed both on the field and in the box score.

It was incredibly painful to watch, and as much as I hate upsetting fans that are clamoring for a front office shakeup or offseason moves toward a competitive team, if I am Al Avila, I am doing neither of those things.

For the Tigers to be sustainably competitive again on a regular basis, they are going to need to be just as bad in 2020 as they were in 2019. I will explain why:

Gone Are the Days of Big Spending

From the 2010-2016 offseasons, while the Tigers pushed to compete for World Series titles every year, the Tigers tied up $829.45 million in free agent commitments, as well as $428 million in extensions to both Justin Verlander and Miguel Cabrera. This $1.26 billion commitment may have made the Tigers competitive, but it also made them a bad business opportunity in those years, as well.

The Tigers’ winning ways brought the crowds that largely put them in the top 5 in the AL and top 10 in MLB from 2007-2016. Those teams were built by hefty payrolls and an owner committed to bringing a winner to the Motor City, and fans responded by showing up in droves to watch the Tigers play. For the most part, however, not even high attendance has been enough to keep the Tigers out of the red. From 2007-2016, they operated on a loss 7 of those 11 years.

It does not take a financial guru to understand that businesses should at least break even, if not operate on a profit in order to keep the doors open, and the Tigers had an owner that was able to and gracious enough to take the hit hoping that one of his teams would eventually break through and win it all. Some of them should have, but those are discussions for another day.

The Tigers lost longtime owner Mike Illitch ahead of the 2017 season, and ownership has been passed along to his son Chris, who has publicly been the face of Tigers ownership since Mr. I’s passing. I am sure Chris wants to win baseball games just as badly as Mr. I did, but I think he also understands that operating on a loss every year is not a financially viable way to run a company, and understandably so. As a result, the Tigers have made concessions on their payroll.

I am curious to see where the Tigers fall in operating income this year, as last year they were in the black for the first time since 2015, and as far as I can see, had the highest operating income for them on record. I think 2019 may even exceed that operating income due to the continued cuts on the player expenses side.

Nonetheless, it’s not to say that the Tigers won’t spend big again. The Tigers have lost both television viewers and ballpark guests in droves the last two years, and it will take a significant investment to bring them back, so I think the Tigers will need to make a large investment in the free agent market (or perhaps a blockbuster trade and a sizable extension for that player) somewhere down the line. However, the Tigers are clearly nowhere near ready to be competitive after a season of 114 losses, so the time is not now to make that investment, when the ROI is minimal.

Champions are Built In The Draft, Player Development

Free agents are sexy, but homegrown players are what bring you championship banners.

Take a look at the last five World Series champions were built: the 2019 Washington Nationals, 2018 Boston Red Sox, 2017 Houston Astros, 2016 Chicago Cubs, and 2015 Kansas City Royals. Each of those teams had free agents that helped them get to where they needed to go, yes. But those free agents were the final touches that tied everything together to build that champion.

Washington signed Max Scherzer and Patrick Corbin, but they drafted and developed Stephen Strasburg, Anthony Rendon, Juan Soto, Victor Robles, and Ryan Zimmerman, and they used their cache of players to trade for guys like Trea Turner and Adam Eaton.

Houston used their treasure trove of minor league phenoms to trade for Justin Verlander in 2017, but drafted and developed guys like Jose Altuve, George Springer, Alex Bregman, Carlos Correa, and Dallas Keuchel. Very much a home grown core.

Chicago had homegrown stars like Anthony Rizzo, Kris Bryant, Addison Russell, Jorge Soler, Javier Baez, and Kyle Schwarber that helped guide them to a championship.

Kansas City’s team was almost entirely homegrown when they won, with Alex Gordon, Eric Hosmer, Alcides Escobar, Lorenzo Cain, Salvador Perez, and Mike Moustakas being either drafted, developed, or brought over via trade to win it all.

These teams all very much have something in common: they had to build from the ground up to get to that championship level. This is the way baseball teams are built now and it is a tried and proven method for success, but it is not an overnight process. The Washington Nationals truly began turning their rebuild around after drafting Stephen Strasburg first overall in 2009, and they drafted first overall again in 2010, netting Bryce Harper. It was those two cornerstone players that ignited a sustained run of competitive baseball that eventually won Washington a championship this year (sans Harper). The Houston Astros, Chicago Cubs, and Kansas City Royals also all drafted high with regularity as well, Houston even netting themselves several top three picks before breaking through the glass ceiling.

These teams have all shown that it takes some pain to build a winner, and the Tigers are in the thick of that right now. They drafted first overall a year ago, they drafted fifth overall this year, and will draft first overall next year. Their farm system is rapidly improving, but they need cornerstone hitters, and outside of Riley Greene they do not have any in the minor leagues. Having an opportunity to draft extremely high in the draft gives them an opportunity to find a cornerstone position player, and history has shown they will need multiple to build a championship caliber team. Another year or two of high draft picks is exactly what this organization needs to have the foundations of a consistent winner.

Concluding Thoughts

I know it is unpleasant to think about a Tigers team that is not going to perform well for the foreseeable future. I also know that growth is often uncomfortable, and that there is currently a lot of good going on behind that scenes that fans can’t tangibly see now, but will be able to soon, even as early as next year with Casey Mize’s inevitable debut.

The finished product of this rebuild is going to be a product that is incredibly fun to watch, and hopefully brings the next championship parade down Woodward Avenue. But I also know that that also means another 100-loss team in 2020, and a 90-95 loss team in 2021.

I promise, it will be worth the wait.

Creating My Own Sabermetric: Offensive Efficiency

As important as scouting can be, the game has shifted into a warm embrace of quantitative analysis using sabermetrics and mathematics to bring player performance down to numbers. Sabermetrics have been used to guide the game’s decision makers for the better part of two decades, and as statistics like Wins Above Replacement (WAR) become more and more popular amongst casual fans, there are statistics that fans aren’t aware of, that teams create and utilize to analyze players and make roster decisions.

I never used to be one that was all that interested in numbers, and in a lot of ways, numbers used to intimidate me. Now, I see mathematics as a challenge that I feel is worth embracing and for awhile now I have been toying with the idea of trying to create my own statistic and use it to analyze players.

Today is the day I attempt to roll that out, in its most imperfect, raw, first draft form: Offensive Effeciency.

Offensive Efficiency: What Is It?

I feel as though this can be a statistic that even the most casual observer can appreciate when it is perfected, because it will help lend evidence to both what you can see on the field and what you cannot see in the box score. I have always thought, personally, that there is unquantified value in some of the game’s quieter outcomes that actually lend to a player’s offensive contribution to a team.

Think about it: a player is at-bat with a runner on second, nobody out. The batter hits a ground ball to second which is thrown to first for the first out of the ballgame. The batter jogs back to the dugout as the first out of the inning, but the runner on second is now on third with only one out. In the next at-bat, the next batter hits a sacrifice fly to the left fielder, and the runner on third comes across to score.

The batter who flew out to the left fielder receives an RBI, but the hitter who moved the runner over to third? He gets a few high fives in the dugout for doing exactly what he was supposed to do, and a net negative on his batting average, on-base percentage, on-base plus slugging percentage, and a myriad of other statistics. The batter did exactly what he was supposed to do, but receives no reward for it in the stat sheet.

This is where, I hope, offensive efficiency (OE) can help fill in the gaps. OE is a statistic that factors all of the outcomes of a hitter’s plate appearances, including the circumstances they arrived to at the plate, and brings everything down to one number. At the end of the day, players are only as good as the outcomes they create with the circumstances they are given. Hopefully, this statistic can bring additional value to players who appear to not have as much and help expose stars who appear to perform better than they actually do.

How Can It Be Quantified?

I have given this statistic years of thought, but I never actually got around to figuring out how to actually calculate this statistic. When it comes to OE, with the number of outcomes an offensive player can actually create with every set of circumstances they come to at the plate, it can be extremely daunting to try and bring everything down to one number. However, what I know for certain is that OE is just an incredibly large weighted average equation.

Weighted average is calculated like an average would be calculated, but each value being calculated is given a weight to associate itself with. The most recognizable examples of weighted average are usually grades in school, as certain parts of school work are worth more to your overall grade than others (e.g. 20% of your final grade is your final exam, 10% is attendance, 25% normal coursework, 30% is exams, 15% is a group presentation).

Obviously, the overall weight of these values has to equal 100%, or 1.0, so, OE will be calculated on a decimal scale that falls between 0.0 and 1.0, much like a batting average, with 1.0 being absolute perfect efficiency and 0.0 being nonexistent offensively.

Why OE?

The goal in creating a value like OE would be that eventually, one would be able to identify the average OE of MLB players, and determine which high OE players are being overlooked and which low OE players are being given too many opportunities. Additionally, it may be a statistic that allows evaluators to look at minor league players and amateur players and determine whether or not those individuals are ready for the next level of play due to their ability to make the most of their offensive opportunities.

So, Where Do We Start to Build This Stat?

As previously mentioned, OE is a very large weighted average equation that calculates the weighted average of ALL of a player’s outcomes divided by their plate appearances. Plate appearances has to be the denominator here, as it is the only statistic that quantifies every single time a batter comes to the plate. At-bats are discriminatory in that they do not include base on balls or sacrifices, and because they do not include every outcome, they cannot be used to calculate OE.

So the numerator is actually every single possible outcome one batter can have, in every circumstance, along with its corresponding weight. Considering the fact that there are SO MANY actual outcomes that exist, this statistic is going to take a lot of work to create. Don’t believe me? Consider most of the outcomes that could happen with nobody on base with one plate appearance:

Nobody on, nobody out:
1. Strikeout
2. Reaches base on a dropped third strike
3. Reaches base on a dropped third strike, advances to 4. 2nd on an error, 5. 3rd on an error, or 6. home on an error.
7. Catcher’s interference
8. Base on balls
9. Base on balls, but advances to 2nd on an error, 10. 3rd on an error, or 11. home on an error.
12. Hit by pitch
13. Reaches 1st on an error
14. Reaches 2nd on an error
15. Reaches 3rd on an error
16. Reaches home on an error
17. Singles
18. Singles, but advances to 2nd on an error, 19. 3rd on an error, or 20. home on an error.
21. Doubles
22. Doubles, but reaches 3rd on an error, or 23. home on an error
24. Triples
25. Triples, but reaches home on an error
26. Home run
27. Records a putout some other way (flyout, groundout, singles/doubles/triples but is tagged out trying to advance), these can all be wrapped up into one possible outcome because regardless, there is nobody on base and when the next batter comes to the plate, the previous batter is not on base.

And, actually, you could argue it necessary to multiply those outcomes by 3 because any of them could come with 0, 1, or 2 outs, and each of those situations are unique in their own right. However, I feel for this exercise it is okay to leave it at the 27 as each of these outcomes can be equally weighted regardless of the number of outs.

However, when runners are added to the basepaths, the number of possible outcomes increases significantly. There are assuredly hundreds of possible outcomes, each meaningful to the game in their own right, and each of them need a weight associated with them. Alas, the complexity of this statistic is enough to keep anyone from possibly explaining it and properly building it in just one blog post alone.

Nonetheless, I do feel as though this could have the makings of a very interesting further discussion and could be used to find future value where there previously was none.

Be on the lookout for a part 2, though it may be awhile until we can put this statistic into practice.

Getting the Most Out of Millennial and Gen-Z Professional Baseball Players

MLB is getting younger.

MLB is undergoing a youth movement. The past few years, the average age of a MLB player has dropped. As more rookie players like Vladimir Guerrero Jr., Eloy Jimenez, Bo Bichette, Fernando Tatis Jr., and Victor Robles enter the fold every year, the average age will continue to trend lower.

Meanwhile, at the time I began writing this post, the folks who manage and coach these players are not trending younger. While kids in their early 20’s are knocking on the door to The Show, they are being managed by guys who were born mostly in the 50’s and 60’s.

A manager’s age is not my thesis statement, this isn’t problematic at all. These are men who have played the game at a high level and were hired due to their on-field success, knowledge of the game, and, sometimes, their clubhouse presence when they were players. They helped get the most out of their teammates. Players gravitated toward them, and their teammates were one of their greatest references on their resume – one of the most significant reasons they got the job.

But, are they great clubhouse presences now? Are they getting the most out of the players they currently manage?

Perhaps some are, but an article I read a few months ago gives me some pause. An LA Times piece titled “How baby boomer managers reach these dang millennial players” (already almost lost this millennial reader with the title alone) written in June this year gives some interesting insights as to how managers now have to manage their players, but I still see disconnect. Take these quotes for example:

“Today, [millennial ball players] don’t know what work ethic is. They don’t know what consistency means.”

“You really can’t make a lot of these [millennial ball players] do anything. You have to find a way to convince them to play hard for you.”

“They’ve been coddled. They’ve always been directed.”

And lastly, my favorite:

“You scream at [millennial ball players], [and] they’re butt-hurt for two weeks.”

Okay, I get it. We grew up in completely different generations that were brought up in completely different ways. But these, to me, sound like excuses not to change their management style, not excuses for why ball players don’t listen. If you find that nobody is listening to you, or your message isn’t resonating, it’s probably time to look inward instead of blaming the individuals you manage. These sound like managers who are out of touch with their staff, and would rather complain about it than change how they manage.

As a millennial that has managed millennials and Gen-Zer’s in a professional setting, the answer lies in culture and philosophy. The issues that these managers are experiencing have almost nothing to do with the actual baseball aspects of the game and instead are entirely an organizational and team culture issue. There are ways to rectify this, and based on my coursework for my MBA program as well as my own real life experiences, these are tips for millennial development and player development that might go a long way not just for a coach, but for managers in every industry:

Identify Differences in Culture, and Listen:

This is probably the easiest thing a manager can do to build motivation and enthusiasm from the younger generations. In a world that is increasingly automating and interconnecting, and access to an infinite wealth of information is more easily available, it is becoming increasingly difficult to figure out who to listen to or which ideas to give credibility to.

There are three major differences between the Major Leaguers of baseball past and present: money, information, and the impact of social media. There is more money in the game than ever before. Where $100 million contracts used to be rare, there were three contracts in excess of $300 million signed last offseason alone, all three signed by millennials. With compounded contracts comes increased expectations, and increased scrutiny when those perceived expectations are not met. With the level of accessibility fans have to professional athletes now, that exposure to criticism is so much more constant than it ever was before. Social media gives athletes the ability to connect with their fans, but also gives fans an outlet to directly attack and criticize in a way that the older generation simply didn’t have to experience.

In regard to information, the amount the older generation had access to, whether that is analytics, sport science, video, or even scouting reports, was far far smaller than the wealth of information players can obtain now. What existed was rigid tradition and routine, there was no “why,” it was just the way things were done and players complied. Very blue collar, very workmanlike.

If this works for your organization, then this is a culture that you can run with and be very successful. However, as younger kids with different and diverse values, beliefs, and behaviors come up through the minor leagues it seems as though parts of this culture are being rejected en masse as implied by the quotes above. If that is truly the case, then organizations should reframe the perspective of management, not require those kids to conform to their idea of a good organizational culture. Sure, they might receive compliance from those kids, but I highly doubt they will see the same level of success or clubhouse cohesion as opposed to letting those kids be a part of the conversation when it comes to the overall culture of the organization.

I don’t want my words misconstrued, it is ultimately the role of the front office and the manager to determine the direction the organization should head, culturally. However, without letting the players be a part of the conversation, and understanding where the barriers, gaps, and obstacles lie between ideologies, then you are not creating a culture that gets the most out of your players. I would also recommend having these conversations if you personally find there are cultural barriers between you and the people you oversee. Eliminating barriers and building bridges between cultural ideologies to find common ground makes for healthier relationships, stronger teams, and more motivated and loyal employees.

Find Your “Why”:

This tip is a direct rebuttal to the second quote above. If you can’t find a way to convince a someone to play hard for your or work hard for you, at what point does it stop becoming your employee’s fault and instead become yours? The article discusses how democratically and relaxed millennial and Gen-Z children have been raised, and because of that, younger players have a much more casual approach to authority. That approach is not going to change, so either the manager’s approach must change, or they are going to lose their grip on the clubhouse quickly.

So how does a leader convince players to play hard for them? As simple as the answer sounds, it’s the correct answer: give them a reason to. Find your “why.” If your suggestions or your leadership are backed by hard data, facts, or successful results, it becomes pretty difficult for players (or employees) not to buy into the direction you want to go. Even more important than those points, however, I think it is crucial that whenever a decision, suggestion, or direction is given to your team, that it be backed by your own core values, passion, and enthusiasm. I think you will find that truly authentic leadership is what younger staffs will respond to, in any industry.

Concluding Thoughts

I truly think teams are starting to see the value in leadership that understands how to connect with the younger clubhouses in Major League Baseball, because I see it in managerial hires all over the game, particularly this offseason already. In October, the Chicago Cubs fired Joe Maddon in favor of bringing on recently retired catcher David Ross, the New York Mets hired recently retired outfielder (and perhaps future hall of famer) Carlos Beltran, and the San Diego Padres hired 38-year-old Jayce Tingler to be their new manager. Ironically, Tingler was chosen over the often quoted Ron Washington in the article above.

The year before, the Minneosta Twins hired recently retired Rocco Baldelli, and the Yankees, Red Sox, and Rays all have early-mid 40’s managers in Aaron Boone, Alex Cora, and Kevin Cash. The game’s field generals are beginning to trend younger, so I think we are starting to see a shift in the ideologies of management and clubhouse culture.

I wholeheartedly believe these younger guys are being given the opportunity to manage because of the positive impacts they had in the clubhouse during their time as players, and the way they resonated with younger players when interacting with them. As the game trends younger, it will take leaders who are able to build bridges between the individual cultures of the younger players and the organizational culture the front office wants to establish, so everyone is on the same page.

Because if you can’t build those bridges, then you are creating obstacles, and perhaps headlines in the LA Times…

Grading Out Riley Greene, Detroit’s #5 Overall Pick

First and foremost, a quick apology for the lack of posts lately. I started graduate school April 11th and have been juggling full-time work and full-time schoolwork since. I have a week off, and plenty to write about.

The Tigers wasted no time last week on their first-round pick at #5, selecting high school outfielder Riley Greene. Riley Greene also wasted no time on his decision between the University of Florida and pro ball, signing a contract with a hefty $6.2 million bonus, forgoing his college eligibility and instead opting to begin his pro career early.

I didn’t have time to write a blog post prior to the draft, but if I did, I would have said the Tigers desperately needed an infusion of offensive upside in their minor league system. This is obvious from my previous blog post in March, ranking the top five prospects in the Tigers system (spoiler: they were all pitchers). I wish there would have been a polished college bat like Andrew Vaughn or J.J. Bleday available at 5, but they were gone before the Tigers had a chance to pick. All told, Greene is not a bad pick in the slightest.

Below I have worked out a scouting report for Riley Greene, listing both his current tools and projecting out his future tools. Scouts use a 20-80 scale to evaluate talent, 20 being the absolute lowest a player can be graded, and 80 being an elite level Major League talent. 50 rates out to Major League average.

A major mistake blogs and publications make when creating scouting reports for amateur players is forgetting to factor in that they are just that, amateurs. They also make the same mistake for minor league players, grading them as major leaguers instead of minor leaguers. The overall point is this: if you see that a publication has listed Riley Greene with a “60” hit tool, it’s inaccurate. Essentially, they are saying that Riley Greene could be an above average hitter in the majors right here, right now, if his hit tool is really graded out as a 60. I do not think Riley Greene is anywhere close to being able to handle big league pitching. I do think, however, he may get there.

Hit Tool (Current 30, Future 60)

Riley Greene is undoubtedly the best pure high school hitter in this draft class. Bobby Witt Jr. was the only other high schooler taken ahead of him in the draft, and he was selected higher due to his high floor and his overall skillset being far more broad (he has excellent speed and will likely stick as a shortstop). However, Bobby can’t swing it quite like Greene can.

Greene has a smooth, quick bat that has been pitted against the best competition both domestically and internationally and he has proven he can hit just about anyone. His bat speed makes up for any hitch he may have in his swing. He has the ability and projectability here to be a potential .300 hitter in the big leagues.

Power Tool (Current 35, Future 65)

If there is a tool in Greene’s arsenal to be excited about, it’s his power. Greene’s raw power isn’t just projectable, it’s already playing at a professional level. Last year, as a junior, Greene displayed professional grade power at Wrigley Field during the All-America Game hitting a home run where Anthony Rizzo and Kyle Schwarber regularly put them as big leaguers. Not only that, but he did it by hitting a mid-90’s fastball.

Not only can Greene hit with massive raw power, he has the hand-eye coordination to already stand his ground against tough pitchers that throw extremely hard. It is rare to find a high schooler polished enough to be both a powerful and patient hitter, and that’s a huge plus for the Tigers. Future 30+ home run potential here.

Run (Current 4o, Future 40)

To put it simply: Riley Greene is already a below average runner, and will likely always be a below average runner. He’s not going to clog up the base paths, but he will be far from a stolen base threat.

Field (Current 25, Future 40)

We’ve already very powerfully (pun intended) established what Greene does really well. However, he’s far from a perfect player, there aren’t many of them out there. Riley Greene was drafted as a high school center fielder, and I’m sure he wants to be a big league center fielder. The brutal reality here is that Greene will never be a center fielder in the majors. Firstly, he lacks the speed needed to patrol the cavernous center field in Detroit, so his range is already below average for a high school defender. With professional instruction, he may improve enough receive the boosts necessary to reach his future “40” projection, but everything about his projectability tells me he will fill out in terms of his strength, not his athleticism. Secondly…

Arm (Current 25, Future 40)

Even if Greene does all of the right things and takes perfect routes to the ball in center field, his arm still isn’t strong enough to make the throws needed to be an elite center fielder in Detroit. Most publications deem Greene’s arm as “acceptable,” or “accurate.” I’ve found most publications to be generous in their assessments or projections of just about anyone. I am pessimistic about Greene’s ability to stick in center field, though his bat is going to be more than productive enough to slot Greene into either left field or first base, if needed.

Overall (Current 30, Future 55)

Riley Greene is currently what I would consider an elite high school talent, which is why he is being graded at a “30” with his overall current tools. His bat is certainly what will carry him throughout his professional career, and the whole reason the Tigers drafted him. He has the eye, the bat speed, and the raw power to develop quickly as a professional hitter and will likely be MLB ready within the next three and a half seasons. Personally, I think his ETA is 2022.

Greene’s defensive ability (or lack thereof) will be what keeps him from developing quickly. You may find yourself frustrated at times if you see him raking in the minor leagues without a promotion to the next level, or you may roll your eyes when you hear Al Avila or Dave Littlefield say he is still sitting in the minors because he needs to work on his defense. They will not be wrong. Greene needs serious work to avoid being a defensive liability at any level, not just the majors. He will likely never be an average fielder, but with professional instruction and years of repetition, he may become a competent one.

Truth be told, when averaging out Greene’s future tools, they technically average out to 50, or about league average. However, his bat is special enough that I don’t feel as though he deserves a league average projection, so I have thrown him a few brownie points for his projectable power, as is customary in the scouting world. So, my conservative projection for Greene’s future overall grade is a 55, or above average.

You may ask yourself why the Tigers would throw $6.2 million at a kid who projects to be slightly above average at the major league level, especially if he’s several years away from the big leagues. That’s a topic for another time, but to be brief, the success rate draft picks in the MLB Draft is far far lower than the NBA, NFL, and NHL. This is a fair gamble by the Tigers, and a good offensive pick with some promise. This is exactly what I hoped to see from the Tigers in this draft, and I hope to see more of it next year as well.

Players’ Response to Avoiding Free Agency: Extensions

We are nearly a week away from Opening Day, and there are still players on the free agent market that shouldn’t be.

Dallas Keuchel, 2015’s Cy Young Award winner, and Craig Kimbrel, the best closer in the game and arguably one of the best of all time, are still free agents as most of baseball is moving toward regular season play. This has become something of a new normal, as last season many marquee free agents, most notably J.D. Martinez and Jake Arrieta, still didn’t have a contract when Spring Training started. This year, the holdouts are Keuchel and Kimbrel (and even Bryce Harper, Manny Machado, Marwin Gonzalez, and others were still free agents at the start of Spring Training).

This new normal will assuredly create tension between the Players Union and MLB when it comes time to renegotiate their Collective Bargaining Agreement. There is already more tension looming between the two parties than there has been in the last 20 years. I’m not sure there’s enough there to potentially create a work stoppage in any way, but we can save that for another day. Either way, players are frustrated, and thinking ahead toward their free agency and wondering whether or not it’s worth the gamble.

For many, both stars and average players alike, they have decided it’s not. They have given their agents the green light to negotiate extensions with teams they currently play for, and have done so in a very big way this offseason. 20 players have signed extensions that have bought out at least one of their free agent eligible years this offseason:

  1. Justin Verlander, RHP Houston Astros, 2 years $66 million
  2. Paul Goldschmidt, 1B St. Louis Cardinals, 5 years $130 million
  3. Chris Sale, LHP Boston Red Sox, 5 years $145 million
  4. Blake Snell, LHP Tampa Bay Rays, 5 years $50 million
  5. Eloy Jiminez, OF Chicago White Sox, 6 years $43 million + 2 options
  6. Mike Trout, OF Los Angeles Angels, 10 years $360 million
  7. Ryan Pressley, RHP Houston Astros, 2 years $17.5 million + 1 option
  8. Alex Bregman, 3B Houston Astros, 5 years $100 million
  9. Brandon Lowe, IF/OF Tampa Bay Rays, 6 years $24 million + 2 options
  10. Jose Leclerc, RHP Texas Rangers, 4 years $14.75 million + 2 options
  11. Miles Mikolas, RHP St. Louis Cardinals, 4 years $68 million
  12. Nolan Arenado, 3B Colorado Rockies, 7 years $234 million
  13. Aaron Hicks, OF New York Yankees, 7 years $70 million + 1 option
  14. Luis Severino, RHP New York Yankees, 4 years $40 million + 1 option
  15. Jorge Polanco, SS Minnesota Twins, 5 years $25.75 million + 2 options
  16. Max Kepler, OF Minnesota Twins, 5 years $35 million + 1 option
  17. Aaron Nola, RHP Philadelphia Phillies, 4 years $45 million + 1 option
  18. Whit Merrifield, 2B Kansas City Royals, 4 years $16.25 million + 1 option
  19. Sonny Gray, RHP Cincinnati Reds, 3 years $30.5 million + 1 option
  20. Carlos Carrasco, RHP Cleveland Indians, 3 years $37.25 million + 1 option

Each player has varying degrees of talent level, star status, and service time that are each contributing to their respective contracts. Nonetheless, an unprecedented number of players agreed to extensions this year, a clear indication that players are becoming less willing to test the free agent market in its current uncertain state. Justin Verlander, Paul Goldschmidt, Chris Sale, Nolan Arenado, Aaron Hicks, Ryan Pressly, and Sonny Gray were all slated for free agency after this season, the first four being easily the most highly coveted of that class. Now, the free agent class becomes much thinner and fewer legitimate franchise centerpieces will be hitting the open market, if any.

Until MLB teams buck the trend of signing players deep into March, their players will be marching to them requesting extensions in lieu of testing the waters. It won’t change next season, and it might take collective bargaining to fix it in 2021.

Money In Baseball: The Minor Leagues

Regardless of your dedication to baseball, or to sports in general of any professional or amateur affiliation, everyone everywhere understands money. We need it to function even on a minimal level, and ideally, the more experience we gain, the more education/training we receive, or the level of talent we attain we expect to be compensated accordingly. The American Dream can be described in many ways: a white picket fence, a big house, multiple houses, multiple cars. My perspective is a lot more simple: financial comfort.

In professional baseball, financial comfort is attained by a very select few – the players that play at the Major League level, amateur players who are drafted at the highest rounds of the MLB Rule 4 Amateur Player Draft, and a handful of international players who are exempt from the constraints of the Draft. Don’t believe me? Let’s dive in:

Major League Salaries vs. Minor League Stipends

We oftentimes hear of the players that obtain the largest contracts, they are the ones that are talked about most often, and not even I am exempt from this. Bryce Harper ($330 million contract) and Manny Machado ($300 million) were recent centerpieces of past blog posts of mine. Even earlier than that, when my blog was a Detroit Tigers-centered fan page, I discussed Miguel Cabrera, Justin Verlander, Max Scherzer, Prince Fielder, and Victor Martinez on a regular basis. Players that have earned hundreds of millions of dollars in contracts that they’ve signed over the course of their illustrious careers. Players that don’t get talked about as often? Everybody else.

For instance, let’s look at rookie Ronald Acuna Jr. of the Atlanta Braves. He won the National League Rookie of the Year in 2018, outperforming every rookie and many established veterans, including generational talents Albert Pujols and Miguel Cabrera (to be fair, Miggy sat out most of the 2018 season with a biceps injury). Both of those players collectively made $60 million in 2018, Acuna made a paltry $545,000 in comparison, and it wasn’t even the full $545,000. Because he was called up April 25th, he missed four weeks of being paid at that salary, so he missed out on nearly $78,000. He will make about the Major League minimum, around $550,000, for the next three seasons.

But that’s not even the most egregious pay disparity. Obviously, one can be financially comfortable on a $545,000 salary. For all 30 MLB teams, they each carry minor league affiliates: seven each, to be exact. They all carry a Rookie League, Advanced Rookie League, Short Season Class-A, Class A, Class-A Advanced, Double-A, and Triple-A affilates. That’s a lot to take in, so I will break it down as follows:

-Rookie League is typically where your 16-year-old international players and recent high school draft picks start. League play starts in mid-June
-Higher end high school draft picks, lesser recent college draft picks, and promoted Rookie League players make up the Advanced Rookie League. League play starts in mid-June.
-Recent college draft picks and promoted Advanced Rookie League players make up the Short Season Class-A. League play starts in mid-June.
-Promoted Short Season Class-A players make up Class-A. Play starts in early April. This is where teams like the Great Lakes Loons, Lansing Lugnuts, and West Michigan Whitecaps reside. Early round draft picks sometimes start at this level after they are signed in June or July.
-Promoted Class-A players make up Class-A Advanced. Play starts in early April. It is very rare for a draft pick to start here.
-Promoted Class-A Advanced and rehabbing Major League players make up Double-A, and promoted Double-A players, minor league free agents, and Major Leaguers who do not make the cut at the Major League level and rehabbing Major Leaguers make up Triple-A. Both start play in early April.

It is a very tall ladder to climb to make it to the Big Leagues, and the pay is far from comfortable compared to Major League players. From Opening Day in April-early September, most minor leaguers make a starting $1,100 monthly salary, with small per diems during road trips. Even breaking that down into an hourly pay for a 40-hour work week, which if we’re being honest with ourselves, with training, practices, and 6 games a week they put in far more than 40 hours, minor league players make about $4.40/hour. Be honest with yourself, could you survive on that wage? This contributes to the extremely low success rate minor leaguers have making it to the Majors.

What About Their Signing Bonuses?

Perhaps you don’t have sympathy for minor leaguers because you feel as though they’re probably mostly millionaires or well off based on the signing bonuses they’ve signed out of the Draft. It’s hard to have sympathy for Casey Mize, the number one overall draft pick in 2018, when he signed a signing bonus of $7.5 million with the Detroit Tigers last summer. But Casey Mize is the exception, not the rule.

In the first round of the amateur player draft, players tend to receive signing bonuses that exceed $1 million. Sometimes, later round draft picks receive signing bonuses that flirt with that amount. Those players are oftentimes set for life and will never have to worry about the ridiculously low minor league payouts and will be able to play relaxed knowing that they don’t have to worry about how they’re going to pay their bills. However, only two or three players per team per draft ever attain that cushy signing bonus. There are 42 rounds of the MLB Draft, and the average signing bonus amongst those 42 picks? $10,000. Many sign for less.

That $10,000 may seem like a lot of money, but it doesn’t even pay my rent for the year. It probably doesn’t pay your mortgage for the year. All signing bonuses over $100,000 are paid out in two installments: one on your first day of camp your first season, and one on Opening Day of your second. Bonuses less than $100,000 are paid out only once. The most common signing bonuses I saw in 2014 were $10,000, $5,000, and $1,000. These were kids that were willing to do anything to secure a spot on a minor league roster and climb the ladder to the Big Leagues. After their first season, they saw a massive decrease in their salaries.

The only way to make more money? Stick in the minors long enough to become a Minor League free agent (6 years service time or being released from your team and ending up lucky enough to maybe negotiate a raise with another team, assuming the want you badly enough), or make it to Triple-A, where the average player receives roughly $10,000 a month. Most minor leaguers never find themselves in either scenario. The percentage is very very low.

How Does MiLB Compare to Other Sports’ Minor League Affiliates?

By comparison, the other sports are far more generous when it comes to their pay scale. The NFL doesn’t have minor league affiliates, but the NHL and NBA both do. The NHL has two minor league affiliates: most commonly the AHL and ECHL. The NBA has the newly minted NBA G-League.

AHL players make an average salary of $90,000 per year, the minimum salary $42,375 in 2015 and has assuredly gone up. ECHL players have a weekly cap of of $13,000+ for 20 players and a minimum weekly pay of $500. Lower level minor league affiliates pay on a similar scale to Minor League Baseball.

NBA G-League players are receiving a base pay of $7,000 per month this season, so a minimum salary of $35,000 per year, but also have the opportunity to receive player bonuses, unlike the NHL and MLB minor league systems.

Even still, these two sports obviously pay far more than your standard minor league baseball player.

Of course, you can argue that the rosters are smaller, and each league has fewer affiliates, so there are fewer places to allocate money. However, MLB generated $10.3 billion in revenue in 2018, and their ownership group is an exclusive club of billionaires at the principle ownership level, so there is money to go around, at least.

The Fallout

There was a class action lawsuit filed on their behalf arguing that MLB owners were not meeting the standards of the federal Fair Labor Standards Act and attempted to force owners to pay players as hourly workers, including for all hours of play and practice.

In March of 2018, Congress passed the Save America’s Pastime Act (SAP) as part of its omnibus spending bill. It exempts baseball teams from having to pay minor league players minimum wage and overtime for all hours worked. They don’t have to be paid hourly, and can continue to be paid a weekly salary for the regular season only, regardless of how many hours they actually work.

The argument was that the SAP Act protected teams and cities in which they play from financial hardship, and the argument on the other side of the debate on minor league pay is that baseball is not a job, it’s not a career, it’s a game, and should not be subject to the regulars of the Fair Labor Standards Act.

I don’t have a dog in this fight, and I won’t state my opinion on the current state of minor leaguers’ pay publicly. But I will inform you, which was the overall point of this piece.

MLB teams are not ignorant to the fact that they pay their minor leaguers in this way, and there may be a movement within the game to change that. This week, the Toronto Blue Jays announced they were going to increase minor league player salaries by 50%. It’s still not arguably livable, but it is an improvement. Time will tell, but I think other teams will start to follow suit.

We’ll see.

MLB Expansion: What Does It Look Like? Part 2 (of 3); Shortening the Regular Season.

Part 1 of this series broke down possible sites for expansion. Part 2 takes things a step further: how do we expand the postseason and create a schedule suitable for 32 teams? Find out.

Part 1 can be read here.

A few weeks ago, I began to look to the future of Major League Baseball. A future that includes two more teams, bringing the league to a total of 32 teams, and two leagues consisting of 16 teams each. Perfectly balanced, as all things should be. But how do we manage squeezing two extra teams into a 162 game schedule?

Simple: you don’t. You shorten the regular season, and expand postseason play.

Shortening the regular season from 162 games to 154 games eliminates 8 games from the regular season schedule, leaving 8 extra days for another postseason round. Adding a fourth division to the fold automatically adds a fourth division winner, and keeping two wild cards allows for a NFL-style playoff bracket. You could also feasibly add two additional wild cards on top of that, allowing for an 8-team free-for-all in each league. Either way, shortening the season allows plenty of time for an additional 5-game playoff series, no problem. Regardless of whether or not you want to implement a NFL-style bracket or a NBA Finals or NHL Stanley Cup bracket, it’s entirely possible with 8 extra days to play with.

154 regular season games also opens up the possibility for a much more balanced schedule and fewer games outside of your time zone. Here’s why:

Examining MLB’s Current 162-Game Schedule

As it stands today, here’s how the current MLB season shakes out:

-19 games vs. intradivisional rivals: (19 x 4 = 72 games)
-6 or 7 games vs. the other 10 interdivisional teams: (somehow it equals 66 games)
-20 interleague games, which consists of one home and one away series vs. one division in the opposite league and one home and one away series vs. an interleague “rival”

72 + 66 + 20 = 162 games. None of this makes sense. Each division in each league plays a completely different schedule compared to the other divisions, leaving the schedule unbalanced. It’s not fair that the NL Central got to beat up on the likes of the horrible Detroit Tigers (98 losses), Chicago White Sox (100 losses), and Kansas City Royals (104 losses) last year in their year vs. AL Central, all the while they never got to face the 108-win Boston Red Sox. Meanwhile, the Red Sox never played a game against the Milwaukee Brewers (96 wins), Chicago Cubs (95 wins), and St. Louis Cardinals (88 wins). Would the Red Sox have won 108 games if they had to face the likes of those talented squads? Maybe, but probably not. That’s the problem right now: schedules are not created equal.

I’ve seen a lot of different schedule proposals for a 154-game regular season, but the one I came up with I feel makes the most sense. This is my proposal for a 154-game season:

Restructuring the Schedule With 32 Teams and 154 Games

To review, the realigned league of 32 teams (with the Rays relocated to Charlotte, NC, and two expansion teams in Nashville, TN, and Portland, OR, respectively) has two evenly distributed leagues with 16 teams each. These 16 teams are distributed by 4 divisions of 4 teams each, based on geographical proximity. My proposed 154-game regular season is structured like so:

-23 games vs. intradivisional opponents (23 x 3 = 69 games)
-3 games vs. interdivisional opponents (3 x 27 = 81 games)
-4 games vs. an interdivisional “rival”, one 2-game home series and one 2-game away series (4 games)

This creates a balanced schedule that eliminates most of the travel issues and balance issues that can arise during a 162-game regular season. Nearly half of your favorite team’s games are guaranteed to stay within the division. 69 games within your own division still puts emphasis on winning your division.

Your team’s divisional games are the only part of the schedule that differs from teams outside of your own division. Other than that, it’s pretty equal, with the exception of your interdivisional rival. This is my way of shaking things up. Each team is paired up with a team outside of their division for a “rivalry series” that every team in the league participates in on the same weekend during the season. For me, I think this makes sense either the weekend of the 4th of July to celebrate America’s past time and prepare for the All-Star break, OR immediately after the All-Star break to keep the momentum of that event going.

I envision this as a marketing opportunity for both teams and television in the middle of the year to break up the monotony of the regular season and gear up for the home stretch. I think it makes sense to randomize the team chosen as a “rivalry” team every year. A huge marketing push for this series is made to build hype, and maybe a trophy and a champagne shower at the end for the series winner (or participation trophies in lieu of a tie, for the millennial in all of us).

Regardless, outside of your divisional games and your rivalry series, the schedule is equal amongst every other team in the league. Every single team plays each other at least once, and allows for the possibility of, say, the Detroit Tigers only taking one west coast trip per year, as opposed to the two they traditionally take per year. The case is the same for the Los Angeles Dodgers, who are taking five trips to the east coast this year. With only 3 games against each team in the Eastern Time Zone, you can split that up between home series with 7 of those teams and road series against the other 7, decreasing the trips out east from five to two.

Lopping 8 games off the schedule effectively removes an entire week of regular season play, allowing the playoffs to start the last week of September, right when football is starting to take over the attention of casual sports’ fans. You could start that series on Monday afternoon, and potentially end a five game series on Saturday night without interfering with anything the NFL is doing.

It’s not perfect, but it does provide balance, and open up several opportunities from both a marketing perspective and postseason expansion.

Part 3 will discuss an expansion draft and how that will affect your favorite team. Coming soon.

Blast From The Past: Statistics Essay From Undergrad, an Introduction

Six years ago, I was a junior at Grand Valley State University. I was taking a sports’ journalism class that required a thoroughly researched and detailed topic that was affecting the world of sports at the time for my final.

I wrote a paper on the Miguel Cabrera/Mike Trout MVP debate and the statistics that drove the argument, in addition to giving my professor a walkthrough on statistics we use in baseball on a regular basis that are inherently flawed. At the end of my paper, I listed statistics that I use on a regular basis that I still believe to this day are good indicators of player performance that stay close to equal amongst all players.

To my knowledge, I have not shown anyone the final essay in its entirety: exceptions being my professor, Andy Rodriguez, and the Milwaukee Brewers.

I received an “A” on the final, and included this paper in my portfolio to the Brewers that I assume, in part, landed me the job. I will eventually share every part of that portfolio on this blog. I also find it important to revisit my experience and the amount of work and dumb luck it took to land me that internship, as well, but I figure this essay is a great place to start. We all use statistics to determine player value, regardless of sport. I will help walk you through which statistics are the good ones in baseball, and why the we should stop using the flawed ones.

Anything related to my past experiences or projects in baseball will be posted monthly.

You can view the post here. Enjoy.

Statistics in Baseball: The Endless Debate. A Blast From the Past.

Thomas Vacanti

April 4th, 2013

WRT 381: Writing In Sports

Personal Essay

Statistics In Baseball: The Endless Debate

Wednesday, October 3rd 2012 in Kansas City, Missouri. The Detroit Tigers were playing the Kansas City Royals on a crisp autumn evening, two teams headed in different directions. The Tigers, freshly crowned the 2012 American League Central champions, were headed to their second consecutive postseason appearance while the Royals were wrapping up their season. Manager Jim Leyland, whether Miguel Cabrera was about to set a milestone or not, was likely going to pull him from this game. Unexpectedly, after Cabrera had taken his place at third base in the bottom of the fourth inning, Leyland motions Cabrera back to the dugout as utility infielder Ramon Santiago ran from the dugout to take his place. As Cabrera returned back to the dugout, every fan in Kansas City, including Royals fans, was on their feet, giving him a standing ovation.

What did Cabrera do to deserve such an ovation in hostile territory? He had just accomplished what no hitter has done since 1967, 45 years prior, when Carl Yastrzemski accomplished the feat for the Boston Red Sox: he had just completed a season where he won the Triple Crown. The Triple Crown club is one of the most exclusive clubs in all of professional sports, and a player wins the Triple Crown when he leads his league (American League or National League) in three categories: batting average, home runs, and runs batted in (RBI). It is such a rare feat, that only twelve Major League Baseball (MLB) players have ever completed it in the modern era, and it has only happened once since the 1960s. For comparison, twenty-three pitchers have thrown a perfect game in MLB history. One can assume, because the Triple Crown is so rare, because no one had done it in 45 years, and because Cabrera’s numbers helped contribute to Detroit’s postseason push, that Cabrera had to be a lock to be the American League’s Most Valuable Player, right? 

The Triple Crown, as rare and incredible of an accomplishment as it is, surprisingly was not enough to automatically crown Miguel Cabrera as the AL’s MVP. Another player, Mike Trout, a center fielder for the Los Angeles Angels, was having a season for the ages himself, and many were engrossed by his sensational performance. When his season was over, at age 21 (he was 20 prior to August 7th), he had accomplished something no one had ever done in the history of MLB. Mike Trout, according to baseball-reference.com, finished his 2012 campaign with an impressive batting average of .326, second only to Miguel Cabrera’s .330, he also led the league with 49 stolen bases, and scored 129 runs, two statistics that Cabrera could not even come close to. 

Trout also played pristine defense, winning a Fielding Bible award for being one of the best defensive players in the game of baseball. On many nights, Trout drew “ooh’s” and “ahh’s” from fans as he made superhuman catches. The most documented was on a sunny Baltimore afternoon, June 27th 2012, when the Angels were playing the Baltimore Orioles. Orioles shortstop J.J. Hardy crushes an 82 mile-per-hour curveball thrown by Jered Weaver. The ball was certain to go over the center field wall, but Mike Trout took a leap of faith, jumping what looked to be three feet in the air, snatching the ball out of midair as it was leaving the ballpark, and bringing it back into play as he crashed into the wall. Many pundits called this play “the catch of the year”, and Trout mania had begun.

Miguel Cabrera, on the other hand, did not have the same defensive credentials. A third basemen during the 2012 season, he had spent much of the past four years as a first baseman, a position that is generally acknowledged as a position that requires less defensive skill than most positions, and he was considered a below-average defender at first base. During the 2012 season, questions surrounded whether or not Cabrera could play third, and he held his own, but he was anything but stellar, he was not even an average defender at third base, according to traditional and modern statistics. 

Late in the 2012 season, leading all the way up to the release of the final polling in November, baseball writers, broadcasters, and fans alike began debating which of the two was the league’s Most Valuable Player. The arguments became heated and almost barbaric, with writers calling out other writers for believing a certain player was more valuable than the other. Those who saw Cabrera as the MVP pointed to his Triple Crown, the rarest of all offensive feats, and the fact that without him, the Detroit Tigers would not be heading to the playoffs in 2012. Those who favored Trout felt that Cabrera’s Triple Crown and Detroit’s playoff berth did not outweigh Trout’s overall performance. They argued that Trout excelled in every facet of the game, while Cabrera excelled only offensively. 

Trout supporters also considered traditional baseball statistics barbaric compared to modern day statistics, which, in their minds, should have convinced the baseball world that Trout was far and away the better player in 2012. Many pointed to the sabermetric Wins Above Replacement (WAR), as a tell-all that Trout was more valuable. WAR is a statistic that, in theory, takes every statistic, offensively, and defensively, and combines those many numbers into one number which shows how many wins above a replacement level player in the minor leagues a specific player was worth. If a player has a WAR above 0, they are more valuable than the average replacement level player, and anything below implies that a specific player could be replaced by a minor leaguer and their team would be better off. Trout led all Major Leaguers in 2012 with a staggeringly high 10.9 WAR, meaning he was worth nearly 11 wins more to his team than the average player. Cabrera, on the other hand, finished a distant fourth with a 7.3 WAR, so pundits argued that Cabrera was far and away an inferior player to Trout, and Trout was more valuable.

On the final day of the season, the Baseball Writers Association of America voted for their AL MVP, and in November Cabrera received 22 of 28 possible first place votes to claim the MVP in a surprising landslide. The debates running rampant through the MLB sportswriting world all but pointed to a tight vote and a Trout victory, but somehow, through all the white noise writers and broadcasters alike were generating, Cabrera had the voters’ support all along. But if Cabrera was only better by traditional offensive statistics, and Trout was widely regarded as the better player, why was Cabrera regarded as more valuable

This essay will try to make sense of the unthinkable. Baseball, and sports in general, are markets that are widely numbers-based, which is why those who follow them are so engrossed by statistics. However, is society putting too much stock into the wrong statistics? This writer believes so, and thinks that MLB, and its following, are seeing the game the wrong way. The hope is that those who read this will have a clearer understanding of what value truly is in baseball, and that someday, traditionalists and modernists alike, can agree that a set group of statistics that define a players’ value better than any other. 

Statistics play an integral role in not only baseball, but sports, and those who watch them in general. Statistics provide something concrete that tells anyone who cares “this is the kind of player so-and-so is.” Sure, one can see that, say, shortstop Jose Reyes is one of the most explosive, dynamic, and exciting players in all of professional baseball, but he never would have received a $100 million contract without statistics that back up the aforementioned statement. Good statistics bring money, and theoretically, wins to a particular team, but casual fans, diehard fans, and experts alike all seem to have differing views on which statistics are most important in determining player value, especially in the game of baseball. 

Statistics may play an important role in other sports, but in baseball, they hold a critical importance to understanding the game and the value a particular player or team holds. Consider the following: a quarterback who throws for over 5,000 passing yards in the NFL is likely widely considered a pristine player, but a first baseman in the Major Leagues who hits for a .300 batting average does not necessarily tell the whole story about the player. That first baseman could have an on-base percentage of .315, which means despite his impressive batting average, he struggles to get on base other than through base hits, which could mean he lacks plate discipline. There are plenty of reasons why a player could have a .315 on-base percentage and a .300 batting average, but the point is this: in baseball, one statistic rarely tells the entire story.

Different statistics in baseball can infer what different things a player is and is not capable of doing on the baseball field. Want to gauge how powerful a player’s swing is? Home runs, slugging percentage, and isolated slugging tell a pretty good story of a player’s power. Wonder how efficient a pitcher is? WHIP (Walks and hits per innings pitched) and FIP (Fielding Independent Pitching) can show how efficient a player is either in a game or throughout an entire season. These statistics are merely the starting point for determining a player’s value. It is known that MLB publishes 85 different individual player statistics, and these statistics do not include sabermetrics, of which accumulate to hundreds of possible ways to evaluate a player.

So how do fans, broadcasters, talent evaluators, and front office executives alike make sense of all the madness? With so many statistics out there, which ones matter, and which ones not so much? There are many statistics that say something about a player, but not many that say everything about a player, and there are a few statistics, in the opinions of many, that say absolutely nothing about a player. In the definition of nothing, it is meant because what that statistic says, does not actually contribute to what that player is worth. For example, the pickoff statistic for pitchers really does not say a whole lot about how good or bad a particular pitcher is. If a pitcher picks off more runners than any other pitcher in baseball, is he better than every other pitcher in baseball? At picking off runners, maybe, but that statistic says absolutely nothing about the value of the pitcher, because, sure, he can catch a baserunner off-guard and throw him out, but suppose he also gives up a lot of runs as well. Does his ability to pick off runners outweigh his weakness of allowing those he does not pick off to score? Absolutely not. 

So if there are statistics that say something, and statistics that say nothing, are there any statistics out there that say everything about a player? There are sabermetrics, modern-day statistics, that try to do just, but unfortunately, few, say anything all too helpful that traditional statistics cannot. Jump back a few pages, and consider the WAR statistic again. As previously explained, is a statistic that tries to bring all of a baseball player’s numbers down to one number: how many wins above a replacement-level player a particular player is. In theory, this sounds like a great way to say exactly how a player might stack up against all the others in baseball, but there is a huge problem with WAR that makes it a statistic that is so inconsistent it is as unreliable as it is near impractical. The biggest problem with WAR, is that if one is researching a particular player, they will likely see a different number depending on where they are researching the player. 

Let’s say, for the sake of argument, this player is Howie Kendrick, a second baseman for the Los Angeles Angels, in 2011. On FanGraphs, one will see that Howie Kendrick has a WAR of 5.8, which was the highest among Angels’ position players that year. 5.8 would also be widely considered a high WAR, particularly for a second baseman, a position that rarely produces elite value. A 5.8 WAR would make Kendrick one of the best second baseman in the game. If, however, instead of FanGraphs, one looked up Kendrick’s WAR on Baseball Prospectus, one would see his WAR is 2.7, an above-average player, but nothing elite, not like FanGraphs was implying. There is also another site, baseball-reference.com, that also calculates its own version of WAR. 

Each version of WAR incorporates different statistics into its formula and calculates it differently than the other two, because of plenty of differing opinion on the importance of statistics. It is quite ironic, really, a statistic that is supposed to be an all-encompassing statistic, but is calculated differently by different people because they feel some statistics are more important than others. Can we, based on the above information, truly trust WAR to gauge the value of a player? Until pundits can agree on one formula and one version of WAR applicable and agreeable by the sabermetrics experts, it is difficult to say that any kind of WAR statistic is a reliable source to find value in a player. It is like comparing apples to oranges, you just will not find any kind of specific agreement between them.

Another statistic that baseball “experts”, writers, fans, and even MLB itself uses constantly but is a statistic that is horrible for gauging player value is OPS, or on-base-plus-slugging percentage. This statistic combines two statistics: on-base percentage and slugging percentage, to show how good a hitter is at combining two integral skills, getting on base and hitting with power. Again, in theory, this seems like a good statistic for seeing how players stack up against each other, but this statistic is fatally flawed. Keith Law of ESPN (2013) said it best: 

“OPS, the fauxbermetric stat that results from a straight addition of the two, ignores the difference in value between the two — a point of extra OBP is worth a lot more to a team’s run-scoring potential than a point of slugging.

Consider two players with an .800 OPS: One has a .350 OBP and a .450 slugging, and one has a .400 OBP and a .400 slugging. The second player is clearly more valuable: He makes fewer outs than the first player, and the number of additional times he’s on base exceeds the number of extra bases added by the first player.” (Law, 2013)

So, in short, two players with the same OPS are not necessarily equal players. The straight addition of both on-base percentage and slugging percentage is creating a fallacy that both of these statistics are equal, but on-base percentage is far more important when it comes to creating runs. How can we be expected to rely on this statistic if what is supposed to be equal is not equal? It is apparent that OPS is a flawed statistic that cannot be used to truly evaluate a player.

Obviously, there is a recurring theme in sabermetrics: two numbers that are equal in one statistic are not necessarily equal in determining player value. Essentially, what I feel is that to truly determine player value, one has to consider statistics that are equal for all players. No gimmicks, no underlying statistics that have to be taken with a grain of salt, no alternative ways to calculate the statistic, just pure equality. Maybe, if we cannot find such equality in regularly used sabermetrics, we can find equality in traditional statistics?

Sadly, the answer to this question is no. Consider the traditional statistic batting average, which is the division of hits by the number of at-bats a player had in a set duration of time. For example, if a player had 200 hits in 600 at-bats, his batting average would be .333. For any player, this is an excellent batting average, but does batting average determine how good a particular player is? The inclination is to say yes, but batting average, like so many other statistics, do not tell the whole story. A player who hits .333 might be a good hitter, or he may be completely lucky. Consider two players who hit .333, but both players have different BABIPs (batting average on balls in play). Batting average on balls in play is the likelihood that a player will receive a hit on a ball he put in play. The higher a player’s BABIP, the luckier a player is said to be, because not every ball that is hit into play results in a hit. So, a player with a .333 average, but a .350 BABIP, is likely a better hitter than the player who hits .333 but has a .410 BABIP, because he does more with fewer opportunities, while the other hitter merely has to put the ball in play to get hits.

Additionally, those two same hitters likely do not have the same amount of at-bats in the same season. Putting at-bats, batting average, and BABIP together tells a different story entirely. If the first player, with a batting average/BABIP of .333/.350 also had 600 at-bats, you know that player was not all that lucky, but the player with the .333/.410 slash line with only 100 at-bats, you can infer that this player has been going through a hot streak, and is a likely beneficiary of luck. So even traditional statistics have major flaws that go along with them.

If sabermetrics are not the answer, and traditional statistics are not the answer, where can we find value? Where can we find equality? Where, in all the inconsistencies and ambiguities, is there a proper means of evaluating a baseball player? Well, there have been clues hidden throughout this entire essay to help reveal part of the answer: there is no one statistic. It requires the assistance of other statistics to help solidify any case of evaluation. There are various statistics, however, that when used correctly, effectively determine the value of a player, and this writer believes that these are the most important statistics in today’s day and age. They are flawed, just like every other statistic out there in some way, shape, or form, but they provide a clearer idea of how valuable a particular player at the basic level than any other.

Batting Average on Balls In Play

Over any period of time, BABIP is a very helpful statistic. To review, a player with a higher BABIP is likely luckier than a player with a lower BABIP. If a player has a good offensive season out of the blue, look at his BABIP, if it is a lot higher than his career norm and the league average, heed caution when picking him up in a fantasy draft, or hold off on optimism when your MLB team signs him. The flaw with this statistic is that players who are speedier than others may benefit from an extra infield single or two which would inflate their BABIP, but it still is a good indicator of the amount of luck that has contributed to a player’s offensive value.

Miguel Cabrera: .331 (Batting average .330), Mike Trout: .383 (Batting average .326)

On Base Percentage

On base percentage by itself is a fantastic way to gauge how productive a player is with his at-bats. Players with higher OBPs are a tougher out than those with lower, and generally are more productive than those with lower OBPs. Is there any ambiguity that a player that gets on base more often than someone else is more valuable? In the game of baseball, I would think that there is only clarity in that statement.

Miguel Cabrera: .393, Mike Trout: .399

Slugging Percentage

Slugging percentage by itself is a way to determine not how many hits a player has, but what a player does with those hits. The higher one’s slugging percentage, the more powerful and more productive the hit. If a General Manager or a fantasy baseball player is looking for a powerful hitter, a player who slugs well is a pretty sure bet. Slugging percentage is slightly flawed because it puts an equal importance on each base when totaling them, but it is an excellent starting point in determining the productivity of a player’s base hits.

Miguel Cabrera: .606, Mike Trout: .564

Those three offensive statistics, for me, are the big three that do a very good job of determining how good a hitter truly is. I threw in the numbers that Cabrera and Trout had during the 2012 season for each of those statistics, and, no contest, Miguel Cabrera was the more valuable offensive player. These statistics show that Mike Trout, offensively, although he may have stolen more bases and scored more runs, was also luckier than Cabrera in terms of getting hits, got on base just a little bit more, and slugged a whole lot less. Cabrera, on the other hand, fought for his base hits due to his low BABIP, but maintained a high batting average. He also slugged a whole lot better, and got on base at a similar clip as Trout. There is no question the more valuable player offensively was Cabrera, based on these near all-encompassing statistics, without even including the facts that Cabrera had won the Triple Crown and slugged his team into the postseason, while Trout’s Angels did not make the playoffs in 2012.

Strikeouts/Walk Percentage

The hitter has three statistics that can display a hitter’s true value, but what about pitchers? Pitchers also have three statistics that represent a pitcher’s value well. The first is strikeouts and walk percentage. There are a lot of things that happen in baseball that a pitcher cannot control. Home runs, errors, terrible defense, different size ballparks, the list goes on, but a pitcher is not a Major League pitcher based on luck alone, because it is rarely the luckiest who pitch the best in professional baseball, but usually the most talented. There are two indisputable things a pitcher is capable of controlling: how many batters a pitcher strikes out, and how many walks a pitcher allows. If a pitcher does not walk many but strikes out plenty, he is a better bet to be a consistently good pitcher than his counterpart who does the opposite. If this is the case, why not use strikeouts and walks per nine innings as opposed to a percentage? Keith Law (2013), in the same piece above about baseball statistics, opines “It’s more instructive to use strikeout and walk percentage — as opposed to strikeouts and walks per nine innings — because some pitchers face more batters per inning than other pitchers, which means they get more chances to strike out or walk them” (Law, 2013). Makes sense.

Fielding Independent Pitching

To best explain what FIP is, I investigated the definitions that each FanGraphs, Baseball Prospectus, and Baseball-Reference had, and they, to the likely surprise and dismay of my readers, have the same formula and definition. FanGraphs (2013) describes it best as such:

Fielding Independent Pitching (FIP) measures what a player’s ERA [earned run average, number of earned runs allowed divided by innings pitched] should have looked like over a given time period, assuming that performance on balls in play and timing were league average. Back in the early 2000s, research by Voros McCracken revealed that the amount of balls that fall in for hits against pitchers do not correlate well across seasons. In other words, pitchers have little control over balls in play. McCracken outlined a better way to assess a pitcher’s talent level by looking at results a pitcher can control: strikeouts, walks, hit by pitches, and homeruns.

A walk is not as harmful as a homerun and a strikeout has less impact than both. FIP accounts for these kinds of differences, presenting the results on the same scale as ERA. It has been shown to be more effective than ERA in terms of predicting future performance and has become a mainstay in sabermetric analysis (FanGraphs, 2013).

If a pitcher has a high ERA, take a look at his FIP, if it is lower than his ERA, he likely was a victim of some bad luck, or some factors that he could not control. Baseball’s best pitchers have some of the games’ best FIP numbers, but pitchers with high ERAs but lower FIPs can be pointed to as guys destined to bounce back.

BABIP 

BABIP is as useful a tool for pitchers as it is for hitters. If one applies what they know from BABIP and reverses the application of it, then it can be used to determine how lucky or unlucky a pitcher is. A pitcher with a low BABIP is likely more lucky than someone with a high BABIP, and anyone with an extreme either way should require some skepticism before declaring that particular pitcher “good” or “bad”.  

So, to conclude, numbers and statistics are an important part of baseball. The right statistics allow the right evaluation of a player. Oftentimes, we tend to overlook the numbers that truly matter, and tend to go with the norms, what people generally regard as accepted. It is time we start looking at the numbers that truly matter, regardless of the status quo. It is time to start asking the right questions, as opposed to wondering silently why something is the way it is. Baseball will someday likely have a set of statistics that everyone involved or relatively interested in the sport will agree upon, but for now, the debate runs rampant. As baseball changes, there will always be a new mean of evaluation, but it is this writer’s hope, through all of the controversy and disagreement, we will find some way to make sense of things, and come to together in agreement. Until that day comes, well, I am anxiously awaiting the first rebuttal to my argument.

“A lot of players told me I’m going to be the MVP, I said, ‘I bet you’re saying the same thing to Trout.’ I always tell them to give credit to Trout. He’s the first rookie to do what he did. He’s great for baseball.” -Miguel Cabrera on his MVP Award, and rookie phenom Mike Trout.

Work’s Cited

2012 Major League Baseball Batting Leaders (2012, October). In baseball-reference.com. Retrieved April 4, 2013, from  HYPERLINK “http://www.baseball-reference.com/leagues/MLB/2012-batting-leaders.shtml” http://www.baseball-reference.com/leagues/MLB/2012-batting-leaders.shtml

(2012). Must C: Catch [Online video]. MLB.com. Retrieved April 4, 2013, from  HYPERLINK “http://mlb.mlb.com/video/play.jsp?content_id=22644539&c_id=mlb&topic_id=vtp_must_c” http://mlb.mlb.com/video/play.jsp?content_id=22644539&c_id=mlb&topic_id=vtp_must_c

DuPaul, G. (2012, June 16). Be Wary of WAR: A Cautionary Tale. In Yahoo Sports. Retrieved April 20, 2013, from  HYPERLINK “http://www.beyondtheboxscore.com/2012/6/16/3085251/be-wary-of-war-a-cautionary-tale” http://www.beyondtheboxscore.com/2012/6/16/3085251/be-wary-of-war-a-cautionary-tale

FIP (2013). In FanGraphs.com. Retrieved April 25, 2013, from  HYPERLINK “http://www.fangraphs.com/library/pitching/fip/” http://www.fangraphs.com/library/pitching/fip/

Law, K. (2013, February 19). The Stats I Can’t Live Without. In ESPN.com. Retrieved April 10, 2013, from http://insider.espn.go.com/mlb/blog/_/name/law_keith/id/8961789/obp-babip-most-important-baseball-statistics-needed-player-evaluation-mlb 

 Statistics courtesy of baseball-reference.com

 Taken from the highlight video, “Trout’s Remarkable Grab”, June 28th, 2012 LAA vs. BAL

 WAR is baseball-reference’s version of WAR, used by ESPN.com

 Courtesy of the BWAA’s website

 Divided by hitting, pitching, and fielding

 Some information is used from a Yahoo Sports Article: “Be Wary of WAR: A Cautionary Tale”

 All Miguel Cabrera/Mike Trout statistics are taken from FanGraphs

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Thomas Vacanti  DATE \@ “MMM d, ”yy, h:mm AM/PM” Aug 15, ’13, 8:51 PM

Collusion or Common Sense? The Death of the MLB 10-Year Contract.

I do feel badly for Bryce Harper and Manny Machado.

They, like Mike Trout, are both once-in-a-generation talent. It isn’t just rare for a player to get called up to the major leagues at age 19 and stick for six (in their case: seven – I can get into that later) straight years to become free agents at the very young age of 26, it’s unheard of.

For it to happen to two players in the same offseason is historic. The last time a player age 26 or younger hit free agency was the year 2000, when a 25-year-old Alex Rodriguez signed the largest free agent deal in history: a 10-year, $252 million deal with the Texas Rangers.

Nineteen years later, pitchers and catchers have already reported for Spring Training, but neither Machado nor Harper have signed a contract with any team. Why? They are both holding out for a larger contract than the one Rodriguez signed: 10+ years, and well over $300 million.

As I’ve mentioned in previous posts – this is not new. This has been happening with regularity the last three offseasons. Teams wait until the last possible minute to sign top free agents, and players are beginning to notice. Former Detroit Tiger Justin Verlander tweeted his own hot take on the situation on Tuesday, and other players and the Player’s Union are whispering, not so loudly, that the owners are intentionally holding out, reluctant to sign players to big money. They avoid the “c” word, but they certainly imply that owners are colluding to bring asking prices down and sign players to shorter, cheaper, more team-friendly deals.

But are we seeing collusion? Or, alternatively, are we seeing something completely different?

As much as I’d like another job in a MLB front office somewhere, I am not saying this to pander to potential employers: I think this is a new wave of business in baseball, and it’s the right call. The reason I say this? Ultimately, 10-year contracts in baseball have largely been irresponsible and costly for the team signing them. Let’s take a look:

10-Year Contracts: A Case Study

There have been only a handful of 10+ year contracts handed out throughout baseball through history. They are as follows:

  1. RHP Wayne Garland; Cleveland Indians 1977 (10 years; $2.3 million)
  2. OF Richie Zisk; Texas Rangers 1978 (10 years; $3 million)
  3. OF Dave Winfield; New York Yankees 1981 (10 years; $23 million)
  4. SS Alex Rodriguez; Texas Rangers 2000 (10 years; $252 million)
  5. SS Derek Jeter; New York Yankees 2000 (10 years; $189 million)
  6. 3B Alex Rodriguez; New York Yankees 2007 (10 years; $275 million after exercising his opt-out clause following the 2007 season)
  7. SS Troy Tulowitzki; Colorado Rockies 2010 (6-year extension, bringing the commitment to 10 years; $157.75 million)
  8. OF Ryan Braun; Milwaukee Brewers 2011 (10 years: $145.5 million)
  9. 1B Albert Pujols; Los Angeles Angels 2012 (10 years; $254 million)
  10. 1B Joey Votto; Cincinnati Reds 2012 (12 years; $251.5 million)
  11. 2B Robinson Cano; Seattle Mariners 2013 (10 years; $240 million)

Ignore the seemingly paltry salaries that Garland, Zisk, and Winfield signed in the late 70’s-early 80’s. Free agency was either just being implemented or in its infancy, and player salaries were much much lower back then. Even still, we can still look at their overall numbers and determine whether or not their contracts were successful or not (spoiler alert: they overwhelmingly were not).

Any contract a baseball player signs contains guaranteed money, meaning regardless of what happens (injury, performance, etc.), the team that signs said player is on the hook for the remaining years and money on that deal unless one of three things happen: 1.) the player retires, thus forgoing any remaining salary left on the contract, 2.) the player is suspended by Major League Baseball, or 3.) the player is traded to another team, in which case the receiving team is required to pay said player the remaining years and salary of the contract – unless, of course, they are subject to either scenario 1 or 2 at any given time.

When a player signs a long-term contract, regardless of how bad things get, a player almost never retires and gives up their remaining salary. Case in point: Prince Fielder signed a 9-year $214 million contract with the Detroit Tigers in 2012. The Tigers traded Fielder to the Texas Rangers during the 2013-2014 offseason for Ian Kinsler and $24 million: payable in $6 million installments from 2016-2020, when his contract is up.

What happened? In August of 2016, not two years into his stint with the Rangers, Fielder held a press conference, announcing that doctor’s have told him he is medically unable to play baseball. Therefore, he will no longer be able to play.

Did he retire? Nope! He phrased it very carefully: he is “medically unable to play baseball.” The Rangers still owe him from 2016-2020, and so do the Tigers, in the form of $6 million this year and next, just like they have the last two years. You can’t blame him, that’s a lot of money to leave on the table, but it’s also a lot of money two teams are playing one player to be sitting somewhere other than in their dugout.

Anyway, I have done some research to determine whether or not each of these 10+ year deals were good baseball decisions by the teams who made them. Many of them ended badly:

Wayne Garland, after signing his deal, only lasted 5 years before the Cleveland Indians cut him loose. In the five years he pitched, he generated a negative bWAR (wins above replacement) of -0.8. I have explained WAR previously, but essentially in any given year, a WAR over 0 means a player has more value than a replacement level player in the minors. Over the course of 5 years, Garland was worse than a minor league pitcher over that span.

In addition, Garland allowed more earned runs than hitters he struck out from 77-81. Yikes.

Richie Zisk fared a little better. He was able to leverage a 2.7 WAR (about Major League average by today’s standards) season in 1977 into a monster contract at the time. Zisk never replicated that season again, or came anywhere close. He was traded three years into his deal with the Rangers to Seattle, and retired three years after that. He never completed the 10 year deal.

Dave Winfield’s contract was mostly successful. He was good for a .275 batting average, 20+ homers, 100 RBI’s, and a great outfield defense every year prior to signing and for much of the life of his contract. He remained relatively steady throughout the life of his contract. I’m sure his only regret was a poor showing in the 1981 postseason, surprisingly their only appearance with Winfield in pinstripes. He was eventually inducted into the Hall of Fame in 2001, deservingly so.

It’s hard to call Alex Rodriguez’s first 10-year contract for the Rangers successful, when he was traded three years into his deal to the New York Yankees. Though through the life of that contract, A-Rod put up phenomenal numbers, which were acknowledged by three MVP awards over the course of the deal, and opted out of that deal after year 7 to sign another 10 year deal. His second 10-year deal, however, was mired by injury, scandal, and suspensions. He walked away from his second deal with a World Series ring in 2009, and a hell of a lot of money, but not much else. He sharply regressed over the second 10 years.

Derek Jeter’s 10-year deal was probably the most successful 10-year contract of the bunch so far, if only because he spent all of it with the New York Yankees and played really solid baseball while doing it. He will be a first-ballot Hall Of Famer next year.

Troy Tulowitzki was already injury-prone prior to be traded to the Toronto Blue Jays in 2015, and continued the life of that contract to prove to be the injury-prone player he always was. When he was on the field, he was a shell of what he used to be. He signed a Major League contract with the Yankees this offseason. How much of his career he is able to salvage remains to be seen.

Ryan Braun, not without scandal, has withstood the life of his contract entirely in one uniform in Milwaukee. He has been a useful player when healthy, but rarely worth the $20 million annually he has been paid. His salary will decrease over the rest of the life of his deal until 2021 when he has to decide whether or not to pick up his $15 million mutual option. In that case, of course, the Brewers also have to agree to pick up his option. If he continues to put up the numbers he did in 2018, they will assuredly buy him out at $4 million.

Albert Pujols is one of the greatest hitters of this generation, no question. In his time in St. Louis, his lowest WAR output was 5.3 in the last year of his contract, and certainly an elite player starting to exit his prime years of his career. The Los Angeles Angels gambled and decided to give him a 10-year contract at age 32, and the results have been horrible: his last three years in LA he has rewarded them with WAR’s of 1.3, -1.8, and 0.5. He’s still owed three more seasons at hefty prices of $28 million, $29 million, and $30 million. He’s a no-doubt Hall of Famer, but not worth what he’s paid. Not even close.

Joey Votto has been consistently great, year after year, in Cincinnati. Even in a 12-homer year last year, his .417 OBP led the league. He’s been worth every penny of his contract so far, but he’ll be 35 in 2019, with 5 more years on his contract. A lot remains to be seen with Votto.

Robinson Cano was recently hit with a suspension for Performance Enhancing Drug use, but contributed 23.7 WAR in his first five years of his contract. A great output. Then, this offseason, was shipped to the New York Mets to finish out the rest of his contract. Still a lot that remains to be seen with him, but not in a Mariners uniform.

Breaking It All Down

Of the 11 players who have ever signed a 10-year+ deal, only 7 have had the chance to see their contracts through. Two of them retired early, two were mired with injury, scandal, or both, two were probably worth it, and the other would have probably been worth it, but he was traded in the middle of the contract. The rest are in the middle of their contracts, but one has been a disaster, one hasn’t been a disaster, but not worth the money, one has been traded in the midst of the deal, and the other has probably been worth it so far.

Taking trades out of the equation, only three of these contracts have been what I consider successful: Derek Jeter, Dave Winfield, and Joey Votto. The rest have been some degree of regrettable. A success rate of less than 30%. It’s no wonder Bryce Harper and Manny Machado are still sitting at home. Teams are more wary than ever to sign a player to a commitment that large.

I also mentioned back in my first post that teams now have access to the same player information through analytics, and are all looking at players the same way. Their philosophies may differ slightly, and so might their approach, but they all have the same information to work with. That information leads to one inevitable conclusion: 10-year contracts are a HUGE gamble, and more often than not, not worth the risk.

That said, Bryce and Manny both very well might sign 10-year contracts before this is all said and done. They also might be worth it. Time will tell.

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