Why the 2020 Detroit Tigers Need to Be Just As Bad As the 2019 Detroit Tigers

2019 was not an easy year to be a Detroit Tigers fan. The team lost a MLB worst 114 games, and in some ways were an even worse team than the 2003 Detroit Tigers, which were one of the worst teams of all time. At the major league level, the team looked lost, devoid of both depth and experience, and it showed both on the field and in the box score.

It was incredibly painful to watch, and as much as I hate upsetting fans that are clamoring for a front office shakeup or offseason moves toward a competitive team, if I am Al Avila, I am doing neither of those things.

For the Tigers to be sustainably competitive again on a regular basis, they are going to need to be just as bad in 2020 as they were in 2019. I will explain why:

Gone Are the Days of Big Spending

From the 2010-2016 offseasons, while the Tigers pushed to compete for World Series titles every year, the Tigers tied up $829.45 million in free agent commitments, as well as $428 million in extensions to both Justin Verlander and Miguel Cabrera. This $1.26 billion commitment may have made the Tigers competitive, but it also made them a bad business opportunity in those years, as well.

The Tigers’ winning ways brought the crowds that largely put them in the top 5 in the AL and top 10 in MLB from 2007-2016. Those teams were built by hefty payrolls and an owner committed to bringing a winner to the Motor City, and fans responded by showing up in droves to watch the Tigers play. For the most part, however, not even high attendance has been enough to keep the Tigers out of the red. From 2007-2016, they operated on a loss 7 of those 11 years.

It does not take a financial guru to understand that businesses should at least break even, if not operate on a profit in order to keep the doors open, and the Tigers had an owner that was able to and gracious enough to take the hit hoping that one of his teams would eventually break through and win it all. Some of them should have, but those are discussions for another day.

The Tigers lost longtime owner Mike Illitch ahead of the 2017 season, and ownership has been passed along to his son Chris, who has publicly been the face of Tigers ownership since Mr. I’s passing. I am sure Chris wants to win baseball games just as badly as Mr. I did, but I think he also understands that operating on a loss every year is not a financially viable way to run a company, and understandably so. As a result, the Tigers have made concessions on their payroll.

I am curious to see where the Tigers fall in operating income this year, as last year they were in the black for the first time since 2015, and as far as I can see, had the highest operating income for them on record. I think 2019 may even exceed that operating income due to the continued cuts on the player expenses side.

Nonetheless, it’s not to say that the Tigers won’t spend big again. The Tigers have lost both television viewers and ballpark guests in droves the last two years, and it will take a significant investment to bring them back, so I think the Tigers will need to make a large investment in the free agent market (or perhaps a blockbuster trade and a sizable extension for that player) somewhere down the line. However, the Tigers are clearly nowhere near ready to be competitive after a season of 114 losses, so the time is not now to make that investment, when the ROI is minimal.

Champions are Built In The Draft, Player Development

Free agents are sexy, but homegrown players are what bring you championship banners.

Take a look at the last five World Series champions were built: the 2019 Washington Nationals, 2018 Boston Red Sox, 2017 Houston Astros, 2016 Chicago Cubs, and 2015 Kansas City Royals. Each of those teams had free agents that helped them get to where they needed to go, yes. But those free agents were the final touches that tied everything together to build that champion.

Washington signed Max Scherzer and Patrick Corbin, but they drafted and developed Stephen Strasburg, Anthony Rendon, Juan Soto, Victor Robles, and Ryan Zimmerman, and they used their cache of players to trade for guys like Trea Turner and Adam Eaton.

Houston used their treasure trove of minor league phenoms to trade for Justin Verlander in 2017, but drafted and developed guys like Jose Altuve, George Springer, Alex Bregman, Carlos Correa, and Dallas Keuchel. Very much a home grown core.

Chicago had homegrown stars like Anthony Rizzo, Kris Bryant, Addison Russell, Jorge Soler, Javier Baez, and Kyle Schwarber that helped guide them to a championship.

Kansas City’s team was almost entirely homegrown when they won, with Alex Gordon, Eric Hosmer, Alcides Escobar, Lorenzo Cain, Salvador Perez, and Mike Moustakas being either drafted, developed, or brought over via trade to win it all.

These teams all very much have something in common: they had to build from the ground up to get to that championship level. This is the way baseball teams are built now and it is a tried and proven method for success, but it is not an overnight process. The Washington Nationals truly began turning their rebuild around after drafting Stephen Strasburg first overall in 2009, and they drafted first overall again in 2010, netting Bryce Harper. It was those two cornerstone players that ignited a sustained run of competitive baseball that eventually won Washington a championship this year (sans Harper). The Houston Astros, Chicago Cubs, and Kansas City Royals also all drafted high with regularity as well, Houston even netting themselves several top three picks before breaking through the glass ceiling.

These teams have all shown that it takes some pain to build a winner, and the Tigers are in the thick of that right now. They drafted first overall a year ago, they drafted fifth overall this year, and will draft first overall next year. Their farm system is rapidly improving, but they need cornerstone hitters, and outside of Riley Greene they do not have any in the minor leagues. Having an opportunity to draft extremely high in the draft gives them an opportunity to find a cornerstone position player, and history has shown they will need multiple to build a championship caliber team. Another year or two of high draft picks is exactly what this organization needs to have the foundations of a consistent winner.

Concluding Thoughts

I know it is unpleasant to think about a Tigers team that is not going to perform well for the foreseeable future. I also know that growth is often uncomfortable, and that there is currently a lot of good going on behind that scenes that fans can’t tangibly see now, but will be able to soon, even as early as next year with Casey Mize’s inevitable debut.

The finished product of this rebuild is going to be a product that is incredibly fun to watch, and hopefully brings the next championship parade down Woodward Avenue. But I also know that that also means another 100-loss team in 2020, and a 90-95 loss team in 2021.

I promise, it will be worth the wait.

Getting the Most Out of Millennial and Gen-Z Professional Baseball Players

MLB is getting younger.

MLB is undergoing a youth movement. The past few years, the average age of a MLB player has dropped. As more rookie players like Vladimir Guerrero Jr., Eloy Jimenez, Bo Bichette, Fernando Tatis Jr., and Victor Robles enter the fold every year, the average age will continue to trend lower.

Meanwhile, at the time I began writing this post, the folks who manage and coach these players are not trending younger. While kids in their early 20’s are knocking on the door to The Show, they are being managed by guys who were born mostly in the 50’s and 60’s.

A manager’s age is not my thesis statement, this isn’t problematic at all. These are men who have played the game at a high level and were hired due to their on-field success, knowledge of the game, and, sometimes, their clubhouse presence when they were players. They helped get the most out of their teammates. Players gravitated toward them, and their teammates were one of their greatest references on their resume – one of the most significant reasons they got the job.

But, are they great clubhouse presences now? Are they getting the most out of the players they currently manage?

Perhaps some are, but an article I read a few months ago gives me some pause. An LA Times piece titled “How baby boomer managers reach these dang millennial players” (already almost lost this millennial reader with the title alone) written in June this year gives some interesting insights as to how managers now have to manage their players, but I still see disconnect. Take these quotes for example:

“Today, [millennial ball players] don’t know what work ethic is. They don’t know what consistency means.”

“You really can’t make a lot of these [millennial ball players] do anything. You have to find a way to convince them to play hard for you.”

“They’ve been coddled. They’ve always been directed.”

And lastly, my favorite:

“You scream at [millennial ball players], [and] they’re butt-hurt for two weeks.”

Okay, I get it. We grew up in completely different generations that were brought up in completely different ways. But these, to me, sound like excuses not to change their management style, not excuses for why ball players don’t listen. If you find that nobody is listening to you, or your message isn’t resonating, it’s probably time to look inward instead of blaming the individuals you manage. These sound like managers who are out of touch with their staff, and would rather complain about it than change how they manage.

As a millennial that has managed millennials and Gen-Zer’s in a professional setting, the answer lies in culture and philosophy. The issues that these managers are experiencing have almost nothing to do with the actual baseball aspects of the game and instead are entirely an organizational and team culture issue. There are ways to rectify this, and based on my coursework for my MBA program as well as my own real life experiences, these are tips for millennial development and player development that might go a long way not just for a coach, but for managers in every industry:

Identify Differences in Culture, and Listen:

This is probably the easiest thing a manager can do to build motivation and enthusiasm from the younger generations. In a world that is increasingly automating and interconnecting, and access to an infinite wealth of information is more easily available, it is becoming increasingly difficult to figure out who to listen to or which ideas to give credibility to.

There are three major differences between the Major Leaguers of baseball past and present: money, information, and the impact of social media. There is more money in the game than ever before. Where $100 million contracts used to be rare, there were three contracts in excess of $300 million signed last offseason alone, all three signed by millennials. With compounded contracts comes increased expectations, and increased scrutiny when those perceived expectations are not met. With the level of accessibility fans have to professional athletes now, that exposure to criticism is so much more constant than it ever was before. Social media gives athletes the ability to connect with their fans, but also gives fans an outlet to directly attack and criticize in a way that the older generation simply didn’t have to experience.

In regard to information, the amount the older generation had access to, whether that is analytics, sport science, video, or even scouting reports, was far far smaller than the wealth of information players can obtain now. What existed was rigid tradition and routine, there was no “why,” it was just the way things were done and players complied. Very blue collar, very workmanlike.

If this works for your organization, then this is a culture that you can run with and be very successful. However, as younger kids with different and diverse values, beliefs, and behaviors come up through the minor leagues it seems as though parts of this culture are being rejected en masse as implied by the quotes above. If that is truly the case, then organizations should reframe the perspective of management, not require those kids to conform to their idea of a good organizational culture. Sure, they might receive compliance from those kids, but I highly doubt they will see the same level of success or clubhouse cohesion as opposed to letting those kids be a part of the conversation when it comes to the overall culture of the organization.

I don’t want my words misconstrued, it is ultimately the role of the front office and the manager to determine the direction the organization should head, culturally. However, without letting the players be a part of the conversation, and understanding where the barriers, gaps, and obstacles lie between ideologies, then you are not creating a culture that gets the most out of your players. I would also recommend having these conversations if you personally find there are cultural barriers between you and the people you oversee. Eliminating barriers and building bridges between cultural ideologies to find common ground makes for healthier relationships, stronger teams, and more motivated and loyal employees.

Find Your “Why”:

This tip is a direct rebuttal to the second quote above. If you can’t find a way to convince a someone to play hard for your or work hard for you, at what point does it stop becoming your employee’s fault and instead become yours? The article discusses how democratically and relaxed millennial and Gen-Z children have been raised, and because of that, younger players have a much more casual approach to authority. That approach is not going to change, so either the manager’s approach must change, or they are going to lose their grip on the clubhouse quickly.

So how does a leader convince players to play hard for them? As simple as the answer sounds, it’s the correct answer: give them a reason to. Find your “why.” If your suggestions or your leadership are backed by hard data, facts, or successful results, it becomes pretty difficult for players (or employees) not to buy into the direction you want to go. Even more important than those points, however, I think it is crucial that whenever a decision, suggestion, or direction is given to your team, that it be backed by your own core values, passion, and enthusiasm. I think you will find that truly authentic leadership is what younger staffs will respond to, in any industry.

Concluding Thoughts

I truly think teams are starting to see the value in leadership that understands how to connect with the younger clubhouses in Major League Baseball, because I see it in managerial hires all over the game, particularly this offseason already. In October, the Chicago Cubs fired Joe Maddon in favor of bringing on recently retired catcher David Ross, the New York Mets hired recently retired outfielder (and perhaps future hall of famer) Carlos Beltran, and the San Diego Padres hired 38-year-old Jayce Tingler to be their new manager. Ironically, Tingler was chosen over the often quoted Ron Washington in the article above.

The year before, the Minneosta Twins hired recently retired Rocco Baldelli, and the Yankees, Red Sox, and Rays all have early-mid 40’s managers in Aaron Boone, Alex Cora, and Kevin Cash. The game’s field generals are beginning to trend younger, so I think we are starting to see a shift in the ideologies of management and clubhouse culture.

I wholeheartedly believe these younger guys are being given the opportunity to manage because of the positive impacts they had in the clubhouse during their time as players, and the way they resonated with younger players when interacting with them. As the game trends younger, it will take leaders who are able to build bridges between the individual cultures of the younger players and the organizational culture the front office wants to establish, so everyone is on the same page.

Because if you can’t build those bridges, then you are creating obstacles, and perhaps headlines in the LA Times…

Grading Out Riley Greene, Detroit’s #5 Overall Pick

First and foremost, a quick apology for the lack of posts lately. I started graduate school April 11th and have been juggling full-time work and full-time schoolwork since. I have a week off, and plenty to write about.

The Tigers wasted no time last week on their first-round pick at #5, selecting high school outfielder Riley Greene. Riley Greene also wasted no time on his decision between the University of Florida and pro ball, signing a contract with a hefty $6.2 million bonus, forgoing his college eligibility and instead opting to begin his pro career early.

I didn’t have time to write a blog post prior to the draft, but if I did, I would have said the Tigers desperately needed an infusion of offensive upside in their minor league system. This is obvious from my previous blog post in March, ranking the top five prospects in the Tigers system (spoiler: they were all pitchers). I wish there would have been a polished college bat like Andrew Vaughn or J.J. Bleday available at 5, but they were gone before the Tigers had a chance to pick. All told, Greene is not a bad pick in the slightest.

Below I have worked out a scouting report for Riley Greene, listing both his current tools and projecting out his future tools. Scouts use a 20-80 scale to evaluate talent, 20 being the absolute lowest a player can be graded, and 80 being an elite level Major League talent. 50 rates out to Major League average.

A major mistake blogs and publications make when creating scouting reports for amateur players is forgetting to factor in that they are just that, amateurs. They also make the same mistake for minor league players, grading them as major leaguers instead of minor leaguers. The overall point is this: if you see that a publication has listed Riley Greene with a “60” hit tool, it’s inaccurate. Essentially, they are saying that Riley Greene could be an above average hitter in the majors right here, right now, if his hit tool is really graded out as a 60. I do not think Riley Greene is anywhere close to being able to handle big league pitching. I do think, however, he may get there.

Hit Tool (Current 30, Future 60)

Riley Greene is undoubtedly the best pure high school hitter in this draft class. Bobby Witt Jr. was the only other high schooler taken ahead of him in the draft, and he was selected higher due to his high floor and his overall skillset being far more broad (he has excellent speed and will likely stick as a shortstop). However, Bobby can’t swing it quite like Greene can.

Greene has a smooth, quick bat that has been pitted against the best competition both domestically and internationally and he has proven he can hit just about anyone. His bat speed makes up for any hitch he may have in his swing. He has the ability and projectability here to be a potential .300 hitter in the big leagues.

Power Tool (Current 35, Future 65)

If there is a tool in Greene’s arsenal to be excited about, it’s his power. Greene’s raw power isn’t just projectable, it’s already playing at a professional level. Last year, as a junior, Greene displayed professional grade power at Wrigley Field during the All-America Game hitting a home run where Anthony Rizzo and Kyle Schwarber regularly put them as big leaguers. Not only that, but he did it by hitting a mid-90’s fastball.

Not only can Greene hit with massive raw power, he has the hand-eye coordination to already stand his ground against tough pitchers that throw extremely hard. It is rare to find a high schooler polished enough to be both a powerful and patient hitter, and that’s a huge plus for the Tigers. Future 30+ home run potential here.

Run (Current 4o, Future 40)

To put it simply: Riley Greene is already a below average runner, and will likely always be a below average runner. He’s not going to clog up the base paths, but he will be far from a stolen base threat.

Field (Current 25, Future 40)

We’ve already very powerfully (pun intended) established what Greene does really well. However, he’s far from a perfect player, there aren’t many of them out there. Riley Greene was drafted as a high school center fielder, and I’m sure he wants to be a big league center fielder. The brutal reality here is that Greene will never be a center fielder in the majors. Firstly, he lacks the speed needed to patrol the cavernous center field in Detroit, so his range is already below average for a high school defender. With professional instruction, he may improve enough receive the boosts necessary to reach his future “40” projection, but everything about his projectability tells me he will fill out in terms of his strength, not his athleticism. Secondly…

Arm (Current 25, Future 40)

Even if Greene does all of the right things and takes perfect routes to the ball in center field, his arm still isn’t strong enough to make the throws needed to be an elite center fielder in Detroit. Most publications deem Greene’s arm as “acceptable,” or “accurate.” I’ve found most publications to be generous in their assessments or projections of just about anyone. I am pessimistic about Greene’s ability to stick in center field, though his bat is going to be more than productive enough to slot Greene into either left field or first base, if needed.

Overall (Current 30, Future 55)

Riley Greene is currently what I would consider an elite high school talent, which is why he is being graded at a “30” with his overall current tools. His bat is certainly what will carry him throughout his professional career, and the whole reason the Tigers drafted him. He has the eye, the bat speed, and the raw power to develop quickly as a professional hitter and will likely be MLB ready within the next three and a half seasons. Personally, I think his ETA is 2022.

Greene’s defensive ability (or lack thereof) will be what keeps him from developing quickly. You may find yourself frustrated at times if you see him raking in the minor leagues without a promotion to the next level, or you may roll your eyes when you hear Al Avila or Dave Littlefield say he is still sitting in the minors because he needs to work on his defense. They will not be wrong. Greene needs serious work to avoid being a defensive liability at any level, not just the majors. He will likely never be an average fielder, but with professional instruction and years of repetition, he may become a competent one.

Truth be told, when averaging out Greene’s future tools, they technically average out to 50, or about league average. However, his bat is special enough that I don’t feel as though he deserves a league average projection, so I have thrown him a few brownie points for his projectable power, as is customary in the scouting world. So, my conservative projection for Greene’s future overall grade is a 55, or above average.

You may ask yourself why the Tigers would throw $6.2 million at a kid who projects to be slightly above average at the major league level, especially if he’s several years away from the big leagues. That’s a topic for another time, but to be brief, the success rate draft picks in the MLB Draft is far far lower than the NBA, NFL, and NHL. This is a fair gamble by the Tigers, and a good offensive pick with some promise. This is exactly what I hoped to see from the Tigers in this draft, and I hope to see more of it next year as well.

A History of MLB Players and Cuba & The Trump Administration’s Cancellation of the MLB/Cuba Agreement

Believe it or not, American politics and baseball go hand-in-hand. It’s been that way for decades.

From MLB’s antitrust exemption Supreme Court ruling in 1922, through the labor stoppages in the early 90’s, to baseball’s steroids’ problem in the late 90’s-late 00’s, American politics has had its hand in America’s pastime. Hell, George W. Bush never even wanted to be President, he wanted to be MLB’s Commissioner (which was later handed to Bud Selig), and he was a former owner of the Texas Rangers. As recently as 2016, a president has customarily thrown out the first pitch of a MLB regular season opener. It has been tradition for decades, despite a lack of participation the last couple of years.

When a company or entity grows to a certain size or a certain level of notoriety, eventually a relationship is forged with the federal government. That relationship is generally defined by either governmental intervention or governmental assistance, and this particular post is an interesting look at both cases.

Before we dig too deep, I want to be perfectly clear: I have thoroughly researched this topic. There is not a whole lot about baseball I don’t know, and what I am writing about is 100% factual. I’ve made damn sure of it.

I have been cautious not to get political to this point, and honestly, this post isn’t really all that political. Though I am going to be, objectively, a little critical of Mr. Trump’s administration here (literally one sentence’s worth, as a matter of fact), I will caution my readers not to rush to defend the Trump Administration’s decision until you read my whole post. Despite the fact that this post is partially political, I made the decision before I even started this blog that my comments’ section will NEVER be politically charged. If you have to defend President Trump, please do so in my DM’s.

The Lead Up to The MLB/Cuba Pact

Prior to 2014, the relationship between MLB and Cuba was identical to the USA and Cuba. A trade embargo, bitterness, and a disdain for each other caused a rift for decades, despite the fact that Havana, Cuba, is less that 90 miles from Key West. Generally speaking, since the USA and Cuba were not on speaking terms, MLB did zero business with Cuban residents, despite that fact that some of them were damn good ballplayers.

Baseball in Cuba has been prevalent as long as baseball has been on the main stage in the United States. The Caribbean has been a hotbed for professional baseball talent for decades and has become a national pastime for several island countries, and MLB has taken notice and interest in those countries’ best players. For places like the Dominican Republic, Aruba, and really any Caribbean or Central/South American nation, it’s been as easy as being noticed by a MLB scout, negotiating a deal with a MLB team, signing a contract, and obtaining a visa to come to the United States to play with the help of MLB.

For Cuban ballplayers, it’s not nearly as easy. Because of the trade embargo, the Cuban government refuses to legally allow its citizens to leave the country to go play professional baseball in the United States. For many, that’s deterrence enough to quash their own dreams of playing in the Majors. For the most talented, current Cuban stars like Jose Abreu, Aroldis Chapman, Jorge Soler, Yasiel Puig, and former Tigers in Yoenis Cespedes and Jose Iglesias, they had to find a different way to the United States to fulfill their dreams.

Because the Cuban government refuses to allow its professional athletes to play abroad, Cuban players have to defect from their country in order to sign a professional contract. For every single Cuban professional player, this means they have to flee from their country, establish residency in a third country, and be cleared by MLB itself before any team can have a conversation with them. This is NOT easy: if you’re playing abroad in, say, Canada, like Jose Iglesias was, you’re escorted everywhere by ten Cuban government officials and will need to find a way to disappear before you’re discovered. For those on the island, you’re fleeing the country by boat, in the middle of the night, risking kidnapping, human trafficking, or worse, in hopes of establishing residency in a neighboring island nation or any nation south of the border. The people smuggling you in are no humanitarians, and make their living extorting those who have successfully defected. In any instance, if you’re caught defecting by any law enforcement or military personnel, or decide you want to return home, you’re sent to prison. If anyone is found with knowledge of your defection, they’re sent to prison, too.

While waiting to establish residency and being cleared by MLB, if anyone catches wind of who you really are or what you’re trying to do, you’re probably deemed a target. You risk kidnapping, being held for ransom, or being shipped back to Cuba every single day you wait.

Even if you sign a contract and make it to the Bigs, you still can’t go home, and your family is not allowed to leave the country to see you. Ever. Cuban players, in many ways, trade one “prison” for another. And the players I listed above are the just the exceptions. For those many defectors who just aren’t good enough to cut a deal, they’re stuck in a foreign country like the DR or Mexico without any chance of seeing their friends or family again. This has been the norm, even up until today. Cuban players must first defect before MLB teams can sign. But things started to change in 2014.

In 2014, relations between Cuba and the United States began to thaw. It wasn’t long before MLB was in talks with the United States Treasury to obtain the federal government’s permission to negotiate with the Cuban Baseball Federation. These negotiations laid the foundation for a groundbreaking agreement that would change the landscape of Cuban free agency, and really started to gain traction in 2016 with an official announcement in late 2018.

The Deal Itself

Human rights issues aside, Cuba has been drawing the short straw on the business end of this whole thing from the very beginning. Not only do they lose their best players through either defection or incarceration, but they also fail to receive a penny of the contracts their country’s players receive, which are some of the biggest in international free agency (only Japanese players have received larger contracts, on average).

MLB and the Cuban Baseball Federation struck up a deal that would have been a win-win-win: MLB teams can negotiate directly with Cuban players that meet certain criteria, players no longer have to defect from their country to sign a MLB or MiLB contract or easily obtain an US visa, and the CBF would receive anywhere from hundreds of thousands to tens of millions of dollars in compensation for each player that is signed. The actual deal calls for a fee that equals anywhere from 15 to 25 percent of the player’s signing bonus to be paid to the CBF, based on certain criteria that the player in question either does or does not meet, such as age, Cuban League service time, etc.

The Issue with the Deal

Now, overall, this deal is very much structured like the deals MLB has with other countries like Japan and South Korea when it comes to signing their nation’s players. The difference is in the fee the MLB team pays for the foreign player, or rather, where that money goes.

For a Japanese player, for example, the team that signs him has to pay a “posting fee”, which is determined based on the size of the overall contract the player signs with a MLB club. Once a deal is struck, the MLB team has to pay the posting fee, which can be upwards of $20 million. The posting fee goes to the Japanese team whom lost the player, which is a privately operated entity.

MLB’s agreement with Cuba is a little bit more complicated. No Cuban baseball teams are privately owned. Their league is managed by one governing body: the Cuban Baseball Federation. Now, whether or not the CBF is under the jurisdiction of the Cuban government is up for interpretation. However, to qualify for the Olympics, the CBF had to make a case convincing enough for the International Olympic Committee to deem them independent of the Cuban government, and they did. The Obama Administration, wanting to renew diplomatic ties with Cuba, sided with the IOC.

The Trump Administration sees things the opposite way. They have changed the original interpretation of the CBF from the previous administration, and are saying that they believe CBF is an affiliate of the Cuban government. They have shut down the deal under this assumption, not wanting any American money finding the pockets of a foreign government, much less a volatile one. I don’t have any additional facts or evidence as to why they see the CBF as a Cuban government affiliate, they just do, at this point. Maybe eventually I will have a chance to update this post, but as of now, this is all I have to go on.

The Fallout

From a business perspective, a baseball perspective, and a human rights perspective, this is a complete and total failure. The Cuban players who would have been free agents this upcoming summer will have defect from their country, risk everything doing so, and wait a year, or longer, to establish residency and obtain clearance from MLB to negotiate and sign a deal. MLB teams will only be able to negotiate with those who have defected. Cuba itself will continue to receive nothing in exchange for those who successfully flee. It’s essentially a return to the norm, a norm that never left.

We will continue to see stories like Yasiel Puig’s: several failed attempts to flee the country ending in a kidnapping in the Yucatan Peninsula alongside three other migrants. Not knowing if he, or the other three migrants, were getting out alive, let alone making it to the United States.

Those 18-25 year olds who leave but never sign will continue to be non-stories as they never see their families again, are forced to start completely new lives in foreign countries with very little to their names, while still likely owing a sizable debt to the smuggler who brought them to that country in the first place.

American politics and baseball go hand-in-hand.

Today I wish it wouldn’t have.

2019 MLB Predictions

Predicting Major League Baseball is an inexact science.

In fact, it’s not science. It’s bullshit.

Nobody can possibly know how 162 games are going to play out. Nobody. I have gotten several predictions right, and several more terribly wrong over my time studying the sport.

So, as I sit here watching the Cardinals hold on to a 3-0 lead over the Milwaukee Brewers and the Blue Jays running away with a 6-0 lead over the Detroit Tigers, here are my best guesses to how the 2019 season will play out.

American League East

  1. New York Yankees
  2. Tampa Bay Rays*
  3. Boston Red Sox
  4. Toronto Blue Jays
  5. Baltimore Orioles

The Yankees have spent the past 5-ish seasons rebuilding their roster and turning over the old core of Derek Jeter, Alex Rodriguez, Mariano Rivera, and Jorge Posada and now have mainstays in Aaron Judge, Giancarlo Stanton, Gleyber Torres, and Luis Severino (there are others I could add here, that’s how stacked they are). Severino is currently hurt, but they have plenty of depth behind him: James Paxton, JA Happ, Masahiro Tanaka, and CC Sabathia will have no problem holding down the fort while Severino recovers, and their bullpen is going to be lights-out this year.

In addition, they welcome back most of their promising young hitters, waiting on shortstop Didi Gregorious to make a return in July, but have Troy Tulowitzki and D.J. Lamahieu to fill in in his absence. They have the depth to withstand any injuries that come their way this year, and I think it all comes together in their first division title since 2012.

The Tampa Bay Rays were a surprise team last year, winning 90+ games and still somehow missing the playoffs. I think they’ll get there this year on the strength of their pitching.

The Boston Red Sox, despite winning 108 games last year, lost their closer in Craig Kimbrel to free agency, and their bullpen was already suspect. Mookie Betts will still play at an MVP-caliber level, J.D. Martinez will still hit, Xander Bogaerts will be an underrated shortstop this year, but I don’t think they have enough bullpen depth to really be a championship caliber team this year. Like most Dave Dombrowski built teams, he’s pushed all his chips to the center of the table, and did it last year. His team lacks a solid bullpen, and that will be his downfall.

The Toronto Blue Jays have exciting young players who are almost ready, but Vladimir Gurrerro Jr. is still in Triple-A, as is Bo Bichette, and they just don’t have a cohesive staff to make a run. They’ll be back in the thick of it before too long, but not this year.

Lastly, the Baltimore Orioles are a mess. They’ll likely be the worst team in baseball again this year. Onto the Central.

American League Central

  1. Minnesota Twins
  2. Cleveland Indians
  3. Chicago White Sox
  4. Kansas City Royals
  5. Detroit Tigers

You read it here first: the Cleveland Indians will be denied a fourth consecutive AL Central title this year.

The Minnesota Twins are a sneaky good team. They’ve got a bona fide ace in Jose Berrios, they have an incredibly athletic team led by a young Byron Buxton who I think will put it all together this year, and they were aggressive in adding more power to their lineup in acquiring Nelson Cruz in the offseason, and some athleticism in Marwin Gonzalez. They also have a very good farm system that has been good for a long time. 2017 was no flash in the pan, the Twins will be competitive for a long time.

The Cleveland Indians, on the other hand, are more of a mess than they look on paper. Their bullpen is devoid of any game changing relievers outside of Brad Hand, and they are fielding the weakest lineup they have fielded in years. Their outfield lacks any solid offensive output, and outside of Jose Ramirez and the currently injured Francisco Lindor, their whole lineup can be categorized as league average at best. Their rotation is still one of the game’s best, but what good is a good rotation when the relievers behind them and the lineup going to bat for them isn’t anything special?

The White Sox are a team on the rise. Eloy Jiminez is my Rookie of the Year favorite right now, and there are signs that they are doing everything they can to prepare for better days. They’re still a year or two away, but they’re a better team than they were last year.

The Royals will not be as bad as they were last year. They are relying on the fastest team in baseball to score them runs, and I think it will pay off for them enough to keep them out of the division’s cellar.

The Tigers, on the other hand, lack major league pitching in a major way. Team ace Michael Fulmer is out for the year, and the rest of their rotation is a below-replacement-level staff. Their bullpen outside of Joe Jiminez is going to be terrible, and their lineup outside of Miguel Cabrera and Nicholas Castellanos is riddled with question marks. Christian Stewart will be a fun player to watch this year, though, so keep an eye on him this year as the Tigers rack up 100+ losses.

American League West

  1. Houston Astros
  2. Oakland A’s*
  3. Los Angeles Angels
  4. Seattle Mariners
  5. Texas Rangers

Houston at the top is predictable. They have one of the most balanced teams in the league. A great rotation, a great lineup, and a good bullpen. That’s going to net them the number 1 seed in the American League. Nothing more needs to be said.

I am not going to count the A’s out this year. They were incredibly lucky last year, and rode several hot streaks into the playoffs only to be ousted in the Wild Card Game at Yankee Stadium in October. They lack a legitimate top-of-the-rotation starting pitcher, but they don’t need one. They’re my “sleeper” pick in the American League, but how much of a sleeper are they if they clinched a playoff spot last year?

The Angels will be better this year than they were last year, I’ll make that prediction right now. But with no Justin Upton for April at the very least, I cannot in good faith deem them any better than a third place team right now.

The Mariners tore down their roster this offseason: they lost Nelson Cruz to the Twins, they sent Robinson Cano and their closer Edwin Diaz to the Mets, their ace Paxton to the Yankees, and they’re probably not done wheeling and dealing at this point. They have no intention of competing this year, and won’t.

The Rangers are devoid of pitching. They will be worse this year than they were last year.

American League MVP: Alex Bregman, Astros
American League Cy Young: Jose Berrios, Twins
American League Rookie of the Year: Eloy Jiminez, White Sox
American League Manager of the Year: Kevin Cash, Tampa Bay Rays

American League Wild Card: Rays over the Athletics
American League Division Series: Astros over the Rays, Yankees over the Twins
American League Championship Series: Yankees over the Astros

National League East

  1. Philadelphia Phillies
  2. Atlanta Braves*
  3. Washington Nationals
  4. New York Mets
  5. Miami Marlins

The NL East and the NL Central are the two divisions that are so difficult for me to make any reasonable predictions for. Both divisions are teeming with talent, it makes it so difficult for me to give any team an edge over any other, but this is the list I’m going with and sticking to it.

The Phillies won the offseason for me, hands down. They added Andrew McCutchen, Bryce Harper, J.T. Realmuto, David Robertson, and Jean Segura, and injected life into both their lineup and their bullpen with those additions. Aaron Nola is my Cy Young pick this year, and Jake Arrieta will improve this year. They need some depth in the back end of that rotation, but have minor league pieces they can move to make that happen at the trade deadline.

The Braves were young last year, but they’re a year older, and a year better this time around. Ronald Acuna Jr. will be the superstar he was last year for a full season, and they have the depth in their lineup that will carry them an entire season. They also have the pitching depth the Phillies lack, with room to grow.

The Nationals lost Bryce Harper and replaced him with my Rookie of the Year favorite in Victor Robles. He will turn heads this year standing alongside Juan Soto in the outfield, and their rotation is the best in the division lead by Max Scherzer, Stephen Strasburg, and free agent signee Patrick Corbin. But I think Corbin is due some regression, their bullpen is suspect, and they just don’t have the star power that the Braves and Phillies do. They, disappointingly, will miss the playoffs again in 2019.

The New York Mets made some very interesting additions this offseason, some I’ve mentioned previously in this post. Their problem is that their offensive power doesn’t match their overrated pitching staff, which, to me, isn’t as good as it looks on paper. They will be 2019’s biggest disappointment, much to the rest of the division’s chagrin.

The Miami Marlins in last place were the only no-brainer in this division. They, in no way, shape, or form, can match any team in this division in any category. They will continue to build in the minor leagues, and look for better days many years down the road.

National League Central

  1. Milwaukee Brewers
  2. St. Louis Cardinals
  3. Chicago Cubs
  4. Cincinnati Reds
  5. Pittsburgh Pirates

This year, it will be the Cardinals, not the Cubs, biting on Milwaukee’s heels as they battle their way through the NL Central this year. The Brewers bring back essentially the same team they did last year, adding the best free agent catcher on the market in Yasmani Grandal. Their deep bullpen, even without Corey Knebel, will carry them all year to their second consecutive NL Central crown.

The Cardinals improved on an already competitive team adding Paul Goldschmidt to the mix. They’ve been bordering on MLB average for the last couple of seasons and made a real playoff push last year, and this year I think they could finally make it back to the postseason with a balanced team of good hitting, good pitching, and a good bullpen. In this prediction, however, it’s not quite enough.

The Chicago Cubs basically stood pat this offseason, which is why I’m putting them in third. They are relying on a lot to go right this year: Yu Darvish coming back healthy, Jose Quintana improving on a lackluster 2018, their bullpen being able to keep them in games. There are too many question marks on this team for me to put them in the postseason. They will miss the postseason for the first time in three years, according to my prediction, though I would not be surprised to be wrong here. Same goes for the NL East.

The Reds improved this offseason, so much so I dedicated an entire blog post to them. Regardless, they just don’t have enough overall to keep pace with the behemoths of the NL Central, which is why I put them in fourth. They could easily finish second if enough goes right for them.

I actually like the Pirates an awful lot. When healthy and firing on all cylinders, a fifth place finish would be an insult to them. However, outside of Jameson Taillon and Chris Archer, they just don’t have a rotation that stacks up with anyone in their division. If they are the fifth place finisher in the NL Central, they’re the best worst team in the league, in my eyes.

National League West

  1. Los Angeles Dodgers
  2. Colorado Rockies*
  3. Arizona Diamondbacks
  4. San Diego Padres
  5. San Francisco Giants

The least sexy pick I can possibly make is the Dodgers at the top of the NL West for the seventh consecutive time, but I don’t see any reason why I shouldn’t. They have one of the most complete teams in the National League, and two consecutive National League pennants speak for themselves. They my National League number-1 seed.

The Colorado Rockies are one of the most underrated teams in baseball. They have a good pitching staff and a great lineup. In addition, they have the most underrated manager in the game in Bud Black. Trevor Story, Nolan Arenado, and Charlie Blackmon are three of the most exciting players in baseball, and their ace Kyle Freeland is a legitimate darkhorse Cy Young candidate. I refuse to sleep on the Rockies this year, they’re my first Wild Card team in the NL.

Despite losing Paul Goldschmidt and A.J. Pollock, I actually really like the Diamondbacks, just not enough to call them contenders.

The Padres’ fortunes are changing. They signed Manny Machado, they called up their top prospect Fernando Tatis Jr., and have more extremely talented minor leaguers on the way. They’re the NL’s Chicago White Sox, about two years away, but will be scary once their minor leaguers are ready.

The Giants are a confusing team. They’ve been built to contend since 2010, but haven’t won anything meaningful since 2014. They’re the team of six years ago, still clinging to the past. It’s time to trade Madison Bumgarner and Evan Longoria for all they’re worth and move on.

National League MVP: Ronald Acuna Jr., Braves
National League Cy Young: Aaron Nola, Phillies
National League Rookie of the Year: Victor Robles, Nationals
National League Manager of the Year: Gabe Kapler, Phillies

National League Wild Card Game: Rockies over the Braves
National League Division Series: Dodgers over the Rockies, Phillies over the Brewers
National League Championship Series: Dodgers over the Phillies

World Series: Yankees over the Dodgers

There you have it, my predictions for 2019. Some will be right, many more will be wrong, but nonetheless, I look forward to seeing how it all plays out.

Players’ Response to Avoiding Free Agency: Extensions

We are nearly a week away from Opening Day, and there are still players on the free agent market that shouldn’t be.

Dallas Keuchel, 2015’s Cy Young Award winner, and Craig Kimbrel, the best closer in the game and arguably one of the best of all time, are still free agents as most of baseball is moving toward regular season play. This has become something of a new normal, as last season many marquee free agents, most notably J.D. Martinez and Jake Arrieta, still didn’t have a contract when Spring Training started. This year, the holdouts are Keuchel and Kimbrel (and even Bryce Harper, Manny Machado, Marwin Gonzalez, and others were still free agents at the start of Spring Training).

This new normal will assuredly create tension between the Players Union and MLB when it comes time to renegotiate their Collective Bargaining Agreement. There is already more tension looming between the two parties than there has been in the last 20 years. I’m not sure there’s enough there to potentially create a work stoppage in any way, but we can save that for another day. Either way, players are frustrated, and thinking ahead toward their free agency and wondering whether or not it’s worth the gamble.

For many, both stars and average players alike, they have decided it’s not. They have given their agents the green light to negotiate extensions with teams they currently play for, and have done so in a very big way this offseason. 20 players have signed extensions that have bought out at least one of their free agent eligible years this offseason:

  1. Justin Verlander, RHP Houston Astros, 2 years $66 million
  2. Paul Goldschmidt, 1B St. Louis Cardinals, 5 years $130 million
  3. Chris Sale, LHP Boston Red Sox, 5 years $145 million
  4. Blake Snell, LHP Tampa Bay Rays, 5 years $50 million
  5. Eloy Jiminez, OF Chicago White Sox, 6 years $43 million + 2 options
  6. Mike Trout, OF Los Angeles Angels, 10 years $360 million
  7. Ryan Pressley, RHP Houston Astros, 2 years $17.5 million + 1 option
  8. Alex Bregman, 3B Houston Astros, 5 years $100 million
  9. Brandon Lowe, IF/OF Tampa Bay Rays, 6 years $24 million + 2 options
  10. Jose Leclerc, RHP Texas Rangers, 4 years $14.75 million + 2 options
  11. Miles Mikolas, RHP St. Louis Cardinals, 4 years $68 million
  12. Nolan Arenado, 3B Colorado Rockies, 7 years $234 million
  13. Aaron Hicks, OF New York Yankees, 7 years $70 million + 1 option
  14. Luis Severino, RHP New York Yankees, 4 years $40 million + 1 option
  15. Jorge Polanco, SS Minnesota Twins, 5 years $25.75 million + 2 options
  16. Max Kepler, OF Minnesota Twins, 5 years $35 million + 1 option
  17. Aaron Nola, RHP Philadelphia Phillies, 4 years $45 million + 1 option
  18. Whit Merrifield, 2B Kansas City Royals, 4 years $16.25 million + 1 option
  19. Sonny Gray, RHP Cincinnati Reds, 3 years $30.5 million + 1 option
  20. Carlos Carrasco, RHP Cleveland Indians, 3 years $37.25 million + 1 option

Each player has varying degrees of talent level, star status, and service time that are each contributing to their respective contracts. Nonetheless, an unprecedented number of players agreed to extensions this year, a clear indication that players are becoming less willing to test the free agent market in its current uncertain state. Justin Verlander, Paul Goldschmidt, Chris Sale, Nolan Arenado, Aaron Hicks, Ryan Pressly, and Sonny Gray were all slated for free agency after this season, the first four being easily the most highly coveted of that class. Now, the free agent class becomes much thinner and fewer legitimate franchise centerpieces will be hitting the open market, if any.

Until MLB teams buck the trend of signing players deep into March, their players will be marching to them requesting extensions in lieu of testing the waters. It won’t change next season, and it might take collective bargaining to fix it in 2021.

Money In Baseball: The Minor Leagues

Regardless of your dedication to baseball, or to sports in general of any professional or amateur affiliation, everyone everywhere understands money. We need it to function even on a minimal level, and ideally, the more experience we gain, the more education/training we receive, or the level of talent we attain we expect to be compensated accordingly. The American Dream can be described in many ways: a white picket fence, a big house, multiple houses, multiple cars. My perspective is a lot more simple: financial comfort.

In professional baseball, financial comfort is attained by a very select few – the players that play at the Major League level, amateur players who are drafted at the highest rounds of the MLB Rule 4 Amateur Player Draft, and a handful of international players who are exempt from the constraints of the Draft. Don’t believe me? Let’s dive in:

Major League Salaries vs. Minor League Stipends

We oftentimes hear of the players that obtain the largest contracts, they are the ones that are talked about most often, and not even I am exempt from this. Bryce Harper ($330 million contract) and Manny Machado ($300 million) were recent centerpieces of past blog posts of mine. Even earlier than that, when my blog was a Detroit Tigers-centered fan page, I discussed Miguel Cabrera, Justin Verlander, Max Scherzer, Prince Fielder, and Victor Martinez on a regular basis. Players that have earned hundreds of millions of dollars in contracts that they’ve signed over the course of their illustrious careers. Players that don’t get talked about as often? Everybody else.

For instance, let’s look at rookie Ronald Acuna Jr. of the Atlanta Braves. He won the National League Rookie of the Year in 2018, outperforming every rookie and many established veterans, including generational talents Albert Pujols and Miguel Cabrera (to be fair, Miggy sat out most of the 2018 season with a biceps injury). Both of those players collectively made $60 million in 2018, Acuna made a paltry $545,000 in comparison, and it wasn’t even the full $545,000. Because he was called up April 25th, he missed four weeks of being paid at that salary, so he missed out on nearly $78,000. He will make about the Major League minimum, around $550,000, for the next three seasons.

But that’s not even the most egregious pay disparity. Obviously, one can be financially comfortable on a $545,000 salary. For all 30 MLB teams, they each carry minor league affiliates: seven each, to be exact. They all carry a Rookie League, Advanced Rookie League, Short Season Class-A, Class A, Class-A Advanced, Double-A, and Triple-A affilates. That’s a lot to take in, so I will break it down as follows:

-Rookie League is typically where your 16-year-old international players and recent high school draft picks start. League play starts in mid-June
-Higher end high school draft picks, lesser recent college draft picks, and promoted Rookie League players make up the Advanced Rookie League. League play starts in mid-June.
-Recent college draft picks and promoted Advanced Rookie League players make up the Short Season Class-A. League play starts in mid-June.
-Promoted Short Season Class-A players make up Class-A. Play starts in early April. This is where teams like the Great Lakes Loons, Lansing Lugnuts, and West Michigan Whitecaps reside. Early round draft picks sometimes start at this level after they are signed in June or July.
-Promoted Class-A players make up Class-A Advanced. Play starts in early April. It is very rare for a draft pick to start here.
-Promoted Class-A Advanced and rehabbing Major League players make up Double-A, and promoted Double-A players, minor league free agents, and Major Leaguers who do not make the cut at the Major League level and rehabbing Major Leaguers make up Triple-A. Both start play in early April.

It is a very tall ladder to climb to make it to the Big Leagues, and the pay is far from comfortable compared to Major League players. From Opening Day in April-early September, most minor leaguers make a starting $1,100 monthly salary, with small per diems during road trips. Even breaking that down into an hourly pay for a 40-hour work week, which if we’re being honest with ourselves, with training, practices, and 6 games a week they put in far more than 40 hours, minor league players make about $4.40/hour. Be honest with yourself, could you survive on that wage? This contributes to the extremely low success rate minor leaguers have making it to the Majors.

What About Their Signing Bonuses?

Perhaps you don’t have sympathy for minor leaguers because you feel as though they’re probably mostly millionaires or well off based on the signing bonuses they’ve signed out of the Draft. It’s hard to have sympathy for Casey Mize, the number one overall draft pick in 2018, when he signed a signing bonus of $7.5 million with the Detroit Tigers last summer. But Casey Mize is the exception, not the rule.

In the first round of the amateur player draft, players tend to receive signing bonuses that exceed $1 million. Sometimes, later round draft picks receive signing bonuses that flirt with that amount. Those players are oftentimes set for life and will never have to worry about the ridiculously low minor league payouts and will be able to play relaxed knowing that they don’t have to worry about how they’re going to pay their bills. However, only two or three players per team per draft ever attain that cushy signing bonus. There are 42 rounds of the MLB Draft, and the average signing bonus amongst those 42 picks? $10,000. Many sign for less.

That $10,000 may seem like a lot of money, but it doesn’t even pay my rent for the year. It probably doesn’t pay your mortgage for the year. All signing bonuses over $100,000 are paid out in two installments: one on your first day of camp your first season, and one on Opening Day of your second. Bonuses less than $100,000 are paid out only once. The most common signing bonuses I saw in 2014 were $10,000, $5,000, and $1,000. These were kids that were willing to do anything to secure a spot on a minor league roster and climb the ladder to the Big Leagues. After their first season, they saw a massive decrease in their salaries.

The only way to make more money? Stick in the minors long enough to become a Minor League free agent (6 years service time or being released from your team and ending up lucky enough to maybe negotiate a raise with another team, assuming the want you badly enough), or make it to Triple-A, where the average player receives roughly $10,000 a month. Most minor leaguers never find themselves in either scenario. The percentage is very very low.

How Does MiLB Compare to Other Sports’ Minor League Affiliates?

By comparison, the other sports are far more generous when it comes to their pay scale. The NFL doesn’t have minor league affiliates, but the NHL and NBA both do. The NHL has two minor league affiliates: most commonly the AHL and ECHL. The NBA has the newly minted NBA G-League.

AHL players make an average salary of $90,000 per year, the minimum salary $42,375 in 2015 and has assuredly gone up. ECHL players have a weekly cap of of $13,000+ for 20 players and a minimum weekly pay of $500. Lower level minor league affiliates pay on a similar scale to Minor League Baseball.

NBA G-League players are receiving a base pay of $7,000 per month this season, so a minimum salary of $35,000 per year, but also have the opportunity to receive player bonuses, unlike the NHL and MLB minor league systems.

Even still, these two sports obviously pay far more than your standard minor league baseball player.

Of course, you can argue that the rosters are smaller, and each league has fewer affiliates, so there are fewer places to allocate money. However, MLB generated $10.3 billion in revenue in 2018, and their ownership group is an exclusive club of billionaires at the principle ownership level, so there is money to go around, at least.

The Fallout

There was a class action lawsuit filed on their behalf arguing that MLB owners were not meeting the standards of the federal Fair Labor Standards Act and attempted to force owners to pay players as hourly workers, including for all hours of play and practice.

In March of 2018, Congress passed the Save America’s Pastime Act (SAP) as part of its omnibus spending bill. It exempts baseball teams from having to pay minor league players minimum wage and overtime for all hours worked. They don’t have to be paid hourly, and can continue to be paid a weekly salary for the regular season only, regardless of how many hours they actually work.

The argument was that the SAP Act protected teams and cities in which they play from financial hardship, and the argument on the other side of the debate on minor league pay is that baseball is not a job, it’s not a career, it’s a game, and should not be subject to the regulars of the Fair Labor Standards Act.

I don’t have a dog in this fight, and I won’t state my opinion on the current state of minor leaguers’ pay publicly. But I will inform you, which was the overall point of this piece.

MLB teams are not ignorant to the fact that they pay their minor leaguers in this way, and there may be a movement within the game to change that. This week, the Toronto Blue Jays announced they were going to increase minor league player salaries by 50%. It’s still not arguably livable, but it is an improvement. Time will tell, but I think other teams will start to follow suit.

We’ll see.

MLB Expansion: What Does It Look Like? Part 2 (of 3); Shortening the Regular Season.

Part 1 of this series broke down possible sites for expansion. Part 2 takes things a step further: how do we expand the postseason and create a schedule suitable for 32 teams? Find out.

Part 1 can be read here.

A few weeks ago, I began to look to the future of Major League Baseball. A future that includes two more teams, bringing the league to a total of 32 teams, and two leagues consisting of 16 teams each. Perfectly balanced, as all things should be. But how do we manage squeezing two extra teams into a 162 game schedule?

Simple: you don’t. You shorten the regular season, and expand postseason play.

Shortening the regular season from 162 games to 154 games eliminates 8 games from the regular season schedule, leaving 8 extra days for another postseason round. Adding a fourth division to the fold automatically adds a fourth division winner, and keeping two wild cards allows for a NFL-style playoff bracket. You could also feasibly add two additional wild cards on top of that, allowing for an 8-team free-for-all in each league. Either way, shortening the season allows plenty of time for an additional 5-game playoff series, no problem. Regardless of whether or not you want to implement a NFL-style bracket or a NBA Finals or NHL Stanley Cup bracket, it’s entirely possible with 8 extra days to play with.

154 regular season games also opens up the possibility for a much more balanced schedule and fewer games outside of your time zone. Here’s why:

Examining MLB’s Current 162-Game Schedule

As it stands today, here’s how the current MLB season shakes out:

-19 games vs. intradivisional rivals: (19 x 4 = 72 games)
-6 or 7 games vs. the other 10 interdivisional teams: (somehow it equals 66 games)
-20 interleague games, which consists of one home and one away series vs. one division in the opposite league and one home and one away series vs. an interleague “rival”

72 + 66 + 20 = 162 games. None of this makes sense. Each division in each league plays a completely different schedule compared to the other divisions, leaving the schedule unbalanced. It’s not fair that the NL Central got to beat up on the likes of the horrible Detroit Tigers (98 losses), Chicago White Sox (100 losses), and Kansas City Royals (104 losses) last year in their year vs. AL Central, all the while they never got to face the 108-win Boston Red Sox. Meanwhile, the Red Sox never played a game against the Milwaukee Brewers (96 wins), Chicago Cubs (95 wins), and St. Louis Cardinals (88 wins). Would the Red Sox have won 108 games if they had to face the likes of those talented squads? Maybe, but probably not. That’s the problem right now: schedules are not created equal.

I’ve seen a lot of different schedule proposals for a 154-game regular season, but the one I came up with I feel makes the most sense. This is my proposal for a 154-game season:

Restructuring the Schedule With 32 Teams and 154 Games

To review, the realigned league of 32 teams (with the Rays relocated to Charlotte, NC, and two expansion teams in Nashville, TN, and Portland, OR, respectively) has two evenly distributed leagues with 16 teams each. These 16 teams are distributed by 4 divisions of 4 teams each, based on geographical proximity. My proposed 154-game regular season is structured like so:

-23 games vs. intradivisional opponents (23 x 3 = 69 games)
-3 games vs. interdivisional opponents (3 x 27 = 81 games)
-4 games vs. an interdivisional “rival”, one 2-game home series and one 2-game away series (4 games)

This creates a balanced schedule that eliminates most of the travel issues and balance issues that can arise during a 162-game regular season. Nearly half of your favorite team’s games are guaranteed to stay within the division. 69 games within your own division still puts emphasis on winning your division.

Your team’s divisional games are the only part of the schedule that differs from teams outside of your own division. Other than that, it’s pretty equal, with the exception of your interdivisional rival. This is my way of shaking things up. Each team is paired up with a team outside of their division for a “rivalry series” that every team in the league participates in on the same weekend during the season. For me, I think this makes sense either the weekend of the 4th of July to celebrate America’s past time and prepare for the All-Star break, OR immediately after the All-Star break to keep the momentum of that event going.

I envision this as a marketing opportunity for both teams and television in the middle of the year to break up the monotony of the regular season and gear up for the home stretch. I think it makes sense to randomize the team chosen as a “rivalry” team every year. A huge marketing push for this series is made to build hype, and maybe a trophy and a champagne shower at the end for the series winner (or participation trophies in lieu of a tie, for the millennial in all of us).

Regardless, outside of your divisional games and your rivalry series, the schedule is equal amongst every other team in the league. Every single team plays each other at least once, and allows for the possibility of, say, the Detroit Tigers only taking one west coast trip per year, as opposed to the two they traditionally take per year. The case is the same for the Los Angeles Dodgers, who are taking five trips to the east coast this year. With only 3 games against each team in the Eastern Time Zone, you can split that up between home series with 7 of those teams and road series against the other 7, decreasing the trips out east from five to two.

Lopping 8 games off the schedule effectively removes an entire week of regular season play, allowing the playoffs to start the last week of September, right when football is starting to take over the attention of casual sports’ fans. You could start that series on Monday afternoon, and potentially end a five game series on Saturday night without interfering with anything the NFL is doing.

It’s not perfect, but it does provide balance, and open up several opportunities from both a marketing perspective and postseason expansion.

Part 3 will discuss an expansion draft and how that will affect your favorite team. Coming soon.

Why Did Bryce Harper Get the Largest Contract In MLB History?

This afternoon, Bryce Harper finally ended his lengthy stay in free agency with a 13-year, $330 million contract with the Philadelphia Phillies. It is the largest contract in MLB history: the largest in guaranteed money, and tied for the longest ever signed alongside then-Miami Marlin now New York Yankee Giancarlo Stanton.

I’ve heard what I’ve expected to hear based on the reaction to this deal: “apparently hitting .249 now nets you $330 million”, “the Phillies grossly overpaid”, “I’m not going to be able to afford tickets to the ballpark now”, and “Manny Machado was better last year.” I want to address each of these in a clear and concise way, while adding my own commentary as to why Bryce is actually deserving of such a contract.

Bryce Harper, cleverly photoshopped into his new jersey with his new team, the Philadelphia Phillies.

“He Only Hit .249 Last Year”

Let’s dispel the fiction that batting average matters right here, right now. If you’ve taken the time to read my lengthy Statistics In Baseball: An Endless Debate essay (and thank you if you did!), I very clearly spell out that batting average is an extremely flawed statistic and doesn’t deserve much in the way of credibly demonstrating offensive ability.

First and foremost, batting average completely ignores every other possible outcome that allows an offensive player to reach base: walks, hit-by-pitch, catcher interference, and errors are all taken out of the equation to compile the statistic, and there is a lot of missing value that gets overlooked when simply looking at batting average alone. Comparing two hitters with the same batting average, and including all of their other stats, you can clearly see that two hitters that have the same batting average are not the same.

Last year, two hitters that qualified for the batting title hit .249: Bryce Harper and the Chicago Cubs’ catcher Wilson Contreras.

Yes, they both hit .249, but Bryce got on base at a much higher clip (.393 to Contreras’ .339) and slugged at a much higher rate as well (.496 vs. .390). There isn’t much debate: Harper very clearly did more with his plate appearances than Contreras, and his hits were clearly more valuable, too, as he hit far more doubles, triples, and home runs with his at-bats than Contreras did. No question, Bryce Harper was the better hitter. Two .249 batting averages are not created equal.

Never mind that he was a .300 hitter in the second half of the season, and has traditionally hit about .280 his entire career. Next.

“The Phillies Grossly Overpaid”

Eh, not really. Not the way that this contract is structured, anyway. Bryce will earn a $10 million salary this year on top of a $20 million signing bonus. He then will make $26 million annually from 2020-2028 and then $22 million annually from 2029-2032.

Yeah, sure, ages 36-39 he’ll be making $22 million, but compare that to Miguel Cabrera, who will make $30 million per year until he’s 42. The Phillies will comparatively save $32 million over the course of those four years compared to Cabrera’s deal, and he will be three years younger when his contract expires. Next.

“I’m Not Going to Be Able to Afford Tickets to the Ballpark Anymore.”

Stop. MLB ticket prices only went up by 4.6% this year using Statista and running a simple percentage growth calculation. Yes, MLB’s revenue has risen an astronomical rate over the past 20 years (which actually further solidifies Bryce Harper’s case for a large contract), but MLB ticketing revenue has stayed pretty much stagnant.

Fans still rely on relative affordability to make it to the ballpark, and MLB teams acknowledge that. Rest easy knowing that Bryce Harper’s massive contract does not directly correlate to your ticket price. In fact, if attendance figures don’t improve this year compared to last, it would not surprise me to see ticket prices actually come down a touch in 2020.

“Manny Machado Was Better Last Year.”

Demonstrably so, and he was rewarded handsomely with a 10-year, $300 million contract with the San Diego Padres. However, there are a few significant things that Bryce brings to the table that Manny does not:

-Rookie of the Year Award

-MVP Award

-Six All-Star Game appearances to Manny’s four

-Endorsements with Gatorade, Underarmour, Warrior Eye Black, and New Era. Machado has zero.

The accolades and the endorsements overwhelmingly paint Harper as the far more marketable player than Machado. Bryce has far more marketing potential as the face of a franchise than Manny does, and it’s not even close.

Nonetheless, both Harper and Machado and their respective new teams will be a lot of fun to watch in both 2019 and the seasons to come.

Collusion or Common Sense? The Death of the MLB 10-Year Contract.

I do feel badly for Bryce Harper and Manny Machado.

They, like Mike Trout, are both once-in-a-generation talent. It isn’t just rare for a player to get called up to the major leagues at age 19 and stick for six (in their case: seven – I can get into that later) straight years to become free agents at the very young age of 26, it’s unheard of.

For it to happen to two players in the same offseason is historic. The last time a player age 26 or younger hit free agency was the year 2000, when a 25-year-old Alex Rodriguez signed the largest free agent deal in history: a 10-year, $252 million deal with the Texas Rangers.

Nineteen years later, pitchers and catchers have already reported for Spring Training, but neither Machado nor Harper have signed a contract with any team. Why? They are both holding out for a larger contract than the one Rodriguez signed: 10+ years, and well over $300 million.

As I’ve mentioned in previous posts – this is not new. This has been happening with regularity the last three offseasons. Teams wait until the last possible minute to sign top free agents, and players are beginning to notice. Former Detroit Tiger Justin Verlander tweeted his own hot take on the situation on Tuesday, and other players and the Player’s Union are whispering, not so loudly, that the owners are intentionally holding out, reluctant to sign players to big money. They avoid the “c” word, but they certainly imply that owners are colluding to bring asking prices down and sign players to shorter, cheaper, more team-friendly deals.

But are we seeing collusion? Or, alternatively, are we seeing something completely different?

As much as I’d like another job in a MLB front office somewhere, I am not saying this to pander to potential employers: I think this is a new wave of business in baseball, and it’s the right call. The reason I say this? Ultimately, 10-year contracts in baseball have largely been irresponsible and costly for the team signing them. Let’s take a look:

10-Year Contracts: A Case Study

There have been only a handful of 10+ year contracts handed out throughout baseball through history. They are as follows:

  1. RHP Wayne Garland; Cleveland Indians 1977 (10 years; $2.3 million)
  2. OF Richie Zisk; Texas Rangers 1978 (10 years; $3 million)
  3. OF Dave Winfield; New York Yankees 1981 (10 years; $23 million)
  4. SS Alex Rodriguez; Texas Rangers 2000 (10 years; $252 million)
  5. SS Derek Jeter; New York Yankees 2000 (10 years; $189 million)
  6. 3B Alex Rodriguez; New York Yankees 2007 (10 years; $275 million after exercising his opt-out clause following the 2007 season)
  7. SS Troy Tulowitzki; Colorado Rockies 2010 (6-year extension, bringing the commitment to 10 years; $157.75 million)
  8. OF Ryan Braun; Milwaukee Brewers 2011 (10 years: $145.5 million)
  9. 1B Albert Pujols; Los Angeles Angels 2012 (10 years; $254 million)
  10. 1B Joey Votto; Cincinnati Reds 2012 (12 years; $251.5 million)
  11. 2B Robinson Cano; Seattle Mariners 2013 (10 years; $240 million)

Ignore the seemingly paltry salaries that Garland, Zisk, and Winfield signed in the late 70’s-early 80’s. Free agency was either just being implemented or in its infancy, and player salaries were much much lower back then. Even still, we can still look at their overall numbers and determine whether or not their contracts were successful or not (spoiler alert: they overwhelmingly were not).

Any contract a baseball player signs contains guaranteed money, meaning regardless of what happens (injury, performance, etc.), the team that signs said player is on the hook for the remaining years and money on that deal unless one of three things happen: 1.) the player retires, thus forgoing any remaining salary left on the contract, 2.) the player is suspended by Major League Baseball, or 3.) the player is traded to another team, in which case the receiving team is required to pay said player the remaining years and salary of the contract – unless, of course, they are subject to either scenario 1 or 2 at any given time.

When a player signs a long-term contract, regardless of how bad things get, a player almost never retires and gives up their remaining salary. Case in point: Prince Fielder signed a 9-year $214 million contract with the Detroit Tigers in 2012. The Tigers traded Fielder to the Texas Rangers during the 2013-2014 offseason for Ian Kinsler and $24 million: payable in $6 million installments from 2016-2020, when his contract is up.

What happened? In August of 2016, not two years into his stint with the Rangers, Fielder held a press conference, announcing that doctor’s have told him he is medically unable to play baseball. Therefore, he will no longer be able to play.

Did he retire? Nope! He phrased it very carefully: he is “medically unable to play baseball.” The Rangers still owe him from 2016-2020, and so do the Tigers, in the form of $6 million this year and next, just like they have the last two years. You can’t blame him, that’s a lot of money to leave on the table, but it’s also a lot of money two teams are playing one player to be sitting somewhere other than in their dugout.

Anyway, I have done some research to determine whether or not each of these 10+ year deals were good baseball decisions by the teams who made them. Many of them ended badly:

Wayne Garland, after signing his deal, only lasted 5 years before the Cleveland Indians cut him loose. In the five years he pitched, he generated a negative bWAR (wins above replacement) of -0.8. I have explained WAR previously, but essentially in any given year, a WAR over 0 means a player has more value than a replacement level player in the minors. Over the course of 5 years, Garland was worse than a minor league pitcher over that span.

In addition, Garland allowed more earned runs than hitters he struck out from 77-81. Yikes.

Richie Zisk fared a little better. He was able to leverage a 2.7 WAR (about Major League average by today’s standards) season in 1977 into a monster contract at the time. Zisk never replicated that season again, or came anywhere close. He was traded three years into his deal with the Rangers to Seattle, and retired three years after that. He never completed the 10 year deal.

Dave Winfield’s contract was mostly successful. He was good for a .275 batting average, 20+ homers, 100 RBI’s, and a great outfield defense every year prior to signing and for much of the life of his contract. He remained relatively steady throughout the life of his contract. I’m sure his only regret was a poor showing in the 1981 postseason, surprisingly their only appearance with Winfield in pinstripes. He was eventually inducted into the Hall of Fame in 2001, deservingly so.

It’s hard to call Alex Rodriguez’s first 10-year contract for the Rangers successful, when he was traded three years into his deal to the New York Yankees. Though through the life of that contract, A-Rod put up phenomenal numbers, which were acknowledged by three MVP awards over the course of the deal, and opted out of that deal after year 7 to sign another 10 year deal. His second 10-year deal, however, was mired by injury, scandal, and suspensions. He walked away from his second deal with a World Series ring in 2009, and a hell of a lot of money, but not much else. He sharply regressed over the second 10 years.

Derek Jeter’s 10-year deal was probably the most successful 10-year contract of the bunch so far, if only because he spent all of it with the New York Yankees and played really solid baseball while doing it. He will be a first-ballot Hall Of Famer next year.

Troy Tulowitzki was already injury-prone prior to be traded to the Toronto Blue Jays in 2015, and continued the life of that contract to prove to be the injury-prone player he always was. When he was on the field, he was a shell of what he used to be. He signed a Major League contract with the Yankees this offseason. How much of his career he is able to salvage remains to be seen.

Ryan Braun, not without scandal, has withstood the life of his contract entirely in one uniform in Milwaukee. He has been a useful player when healthy, but rarely worth the $20 million annually he has been paid. His salary will decrease over the rest of the life of his deal until 2021 when he has to decide whether or not to pick up his $15 million mutual option. In that case, of course, the Brewers also have to agree to pick up his option. If he continues to put up the numbers he did in 2018, they will assuredly buy him out at $4 million.

Albert Pujols is one of the greatest hitters of this generation, no question. In his time in St. Louis, his lowest WAR output was 5.3 in the last year of his contract, and certainly an elite player starting to exit his prime years of his career. The Los Angeles Angels gambled and decided to give him a 10-year contract at age 32, and the results have been horrible: his last three years in LA he has rewarded them with WAR’s of 1.3, -1.8, and 0.5. He’s still owed three more seasons at hefty prices of $28 million, $29 million, and $30 million. He’s a no-doubt Hall of Famer, but not worth what he’s paid. Not even close.

Joey Votto has been consistently great, year after year, in Cincinnati. Even in a 12-homer year last year, his .417 OBP led the league. He’s been worth every penny of his contract so far, but he’ll be 35 in 2019, with 5 more years on his contract. A lot remains to be seen with Votto.

Robinson Cano was recently hit with a suspension for Performance Enhancing Drug use, but contributed 23.7 WAR in his first five years of his contract. A great output. Then, this offseason, was shipped to the New York Mets to finish out the rest of his contract. Still a lot that remains to be seen with him, but not in a Mariners uniform.

Breaking It All Down

Of the 11 players who have ever signed a 10-year+ deal, only 7 have had the chance to see their contracts through. Two of them retired early, two were mired with injury, scandal, or both, two were probably worth it, and the other would have probably been worth it, but he was traded in the middle of the contract. The rest are in the middle of their contracts, but one has been a disaster, one hasn’t been a disaster, but not worth the money, one has been traded in the midst of the deal, and the other has probably been worth it so far.

Taking trades out of the equation, only three of these contracts have been what I consider successful: Derek Jeter, Dave Winfield, and Joey Votto. The rest have been some degree of regrettable. A success rate of less than 30%. It’s no wonder Bryce Harper and Manny Machado are still sitting at home. Teams are more wary than ever to sign a player to a commitment that large.

I also mentioned back in my first post that teams now have access to the same player information through analytics, and are all looking at players the same way. Their philosophies may differ slightly, and so might their approach, but they all have the same information to work with. That information leads to one inevitable conclusion: 10-year contracts are a HUGE gamble, and more often than not, not worth the risk.

That said, Bryce and Manny both very well might sign 10-year contracts before this is all said and done. They also might be worth it. Time will tell.

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